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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Stevens is widely viewed as "enigmatic, unpredictable, [a]
maverick, a wild card, a loner."1 And his opinions support that impres-
sion. He advocates judicial restraint, objects to decisions based on the
will of the judges rather than on what the law commands, 2 but also takes
the Court to task for not "appreciat[ing] the value of individual liberty."'3
There is statistical support for the view that Justice Stevens' views
are difficult to predict. A maverick judge is as likely to agree with one
group of colleagues as another, rather than siding primarily with judges
in one judicial camp. This tendency can be measured statistically as vari-
ation in the rate of agreement with fellow Justices: A judge who is as
likely to agree with one judge as another will vote with every colleague
(whether "liberal" or "conservative") in the same percentage of cases.
Thus, for a maverick judge the variation in rate of agreement would be
1. B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 15 (1988) (quoting
Greenhouse, In the Matter of Labels, a Loner, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1984, at A8, col. 3); see also
Blackmun Has Sharp Opinions of Colleagues, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1988, at AI0, col. 4 (Justice
Blackmun) (maverick); R. SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1988) (mav-
erick, gadfly, and wild card).
2. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 282-83 (1984) (dissenting)
("[C]ynics-parading under the banner of legal realism-are given a measure of credibility whenever
the Court bases a decision on its own notions of sound policy, rather than on what the law com-
mands.") (citation omitted).
Throughout this article, citation form for Supreme Court opinions according to A Uniform
System of Citation (Blue Book) will be altered in the following respects: first, all opinions are by
Justice Stevens unless otherwise indicated. Second, Stevens' authorship of majority opinions is spe-
cifically noted, to provide explicit contrast with his separate concurrences, dissents, and procedural
opinions.
3. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 358 (1985) (dissenting).
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zero.4 By contrast, a predictably conservative judge will agree with fel-
low conservatives most of the time (e.g., eighty-five percent), but with
liberal judges much less often (e.g., forty percent), thereby exhibiting
considerable variation in rate of agreement. A statistical measure of vari-
ation,5 based on Harvard Law Review tabulations of Supreme Court Jus-
tice voting alignments for the 1975 to 1987 Terms, reveals the dramatic
finding that, except for Justice Blackmun in 1983, Justice Stevens had the
least variation over this period of time of any Justice.6
Data indicating a tendency to agree at more or less the same rate
with a wide range of Justices might be consistent with the voting align-
ment of an easy-to-predict middle-of-the-roader, however, as well as a
maverick judge of independent mind. Other data, though, supports the
view that Justice Stevens is a highly independent judge. One appropriate
4. The point is not that the judge is agreeable (that would produce a high rate of agreement,
such as 90%, with other judges), but that the rate of agreement is the same with judges of all
persuasions.
5. The Table in note 6 infra uses the standard deviation to measure variation. For an explana-
tion of standard deviation, see J. MUELLER, K. SCHUESSLER & H. COSTNER, STATISTICAL REA-
SONING IN SOCIOLOGY 156-66 (1970). The Table shows how much dispersion from an average rate
of agreement each Justice shows. Wide dispersion means a high variance in rates of agreement. For
example, if there are three Justices, the judge who agrees with her two colleagues in 60% and 70% of
the cases shows less variation than one who agrees with one judge 55% and another 75% of the
time, who in turn shows less variation than a third judge who agrees with one judge 90% and
another 10% of the time.
6. Amount of Variation Among Rates of Agreements of Supreme Court Justices-Standard
Deviation
Judge 1973-77 1978-82 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Stevens 3.6 3.1 7.7 3.1 7.4 8.8 4.0 5.9
White 8.6 4.6 11.2 11.0 13.1 14.8 7.5 15.2
Stewart 9.1 7.8 - - - - - -
Rehnquist 17.9 17.3 18.6 16.4 22.1 21.9 10.3 19.1
Powell 13.5 11.7 13.6 9.0 15.6 12.5 - -
O'Connor - 14.2 16.6 13.0 14.2 17.0 11.2 16.9
Marshall 13.9 14.7 15.0 16.4 19.0 21.4 14.3 17.0
Burger 17.1 13.4 15.9 15.4 20.7 - - -
Brennan 14.6 13.6 13.9 15.4 16.5 20.5 13.1 15.8
Blackmun 12.6 4.4 4.6 4.9 13.0 10.7 6.9 10.5
Douglas 13.2 - - - - - - -
Scalia .- - 17.7 12.0 14.4
Kennedy .. . . . . 9.8 17.6
A less precise measure of variance looks at the extreme highs and lows. By this
measure as well, Justice Stevens was less extreme than other judges. He had less
variation between the top and bottom rates of agreement with other judges in all of
the years in the above Tables, except for 1983, when Justice Blackmun had less
variation.
Source: 1973-77, Five Year Table II(B), 92 HARV. L. REv. 338 (1978); 1978-82, Five
Year Table II(B), 97 HARV. L. REv. 305 (1983); 1983, Table I(B), 98 HARV. L. REv.
308 (1984); 1984, Table I(B), 99 HARV. L. REV. 323 (1984); 1985, Table I(B), 100
HARV. L. REV. 305 (1986); 1986, Table I(B), 101 HARV. L. REV. 363 (1987); 1987,
Table I(B), 102 HARV. L. REv. 351 (1988); Table I(B), 103 HARV. L. REV. 395
(1989).
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measure of independence is the frequency a judge submits separate con-
curring and dissenting opinions. An independent judge is more likely to
write separate opinions, rather than simply join colleagues without ex-
pressing a distinct point of view. During the twelve-year period for
which Justice Stevens served on the Court and for which data have been
compiled by the Harvard Law Review as of this writing,7 Justice Stevens'
total number of concurring and dissenting opinions exceeded that of any
other Justice in eight of those twelve years. 8
Although hard-to-predict and independent, Justice Stevens has a co-
herent judicial philosophy-that of a common law lawyer adapting his
views to modem conditions. Justice Stevens' special brand of judicial
restraint and creativity are defined by three interrelated principles. First,
the Court should not decide cases that other institutions can decide at
least as well or better. This principle requires deference to other deci-
sionmakers, such as the states, lower federal courts, and the legislature.
Second, the Court should decide no more than the facts of the case re-
quire. This principle calls for deliberation about the facts of a particular
case, avoiding overly broad generalizations and summary dispositions.
These two principles-deference and deliberation-constitute the formal
procedural norms underlying Justice Stevens' judicial restraint. Third,
the Court should protect individual dignity. This principle translates
into a substantive commitment to a deliberative process in both judicial
and nonjudicial settings, and to a creative application of constitutional
principles, such as due process and equal protection.
7. Opinions are omitted for the 1975 Term during which Justice Stevens served only part of
the year.
8. The figures are:
Justice Stevens: Total concurring and dissenting opinions and rank among Justices
Term Total Rank
1976 44 1
1977 31 2
1978 20 6
1979 33 2
1980 42 1
1981 41 1
1982 39 1
1983 52 1
1984 42 1
1985 51 1
1986 45 1
1987 23 4
1988 36 1
HARV. L. REV. annual compilations, supra note 6. See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 15
(more dissents, often by himself, than other Justices).
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Deference, deliberation, and individual dignity values are all interre-
lated. Judicial deference to other institutions preserves the Court's time
and political capital to implement the second and third objectives--delib-
eration about the facts of a particular case and protection of individual
dignity values. And the second principle-judicial deliberation focused
on the facts of the particular case-both formally restrains the breadth of
a judicial decision and implements substantive dignity values by paying
genuine heed to the litigants' claims. Justice Stevens explicitly linked the
frequent writing of separate opinions to dignity values when, during his
confirmation hearings, he defended the practice as one that assures liti-
gants their arguments were understood fairly.9
These principles and their interrelationships represent a modem ad-
aptation of strands of thought prevalent in the common law tradition.
Before the 19th century, the common law was closely associated with the
protection of individual rights from the government. The common law
was itself a right, in the vague but palpable sense of the "rule of law,"
and also was the embodiment of specific rights protecting the individual
from government intrusion.10 Common law property rights, which had
not yet attained a commercial connotation, served as a bulwark against
government tyranny."1 The shift in the 19th century toward a more in-
strumental conception of the common law' 2 did not eliminate the earlier
association between the common law and individual rights. Indeed, law-
yers who objected to codification of the common law often voiced their
fears that common law rights would be lost.13
Another strand of thought characteristic of the common law tradi-
tion is judicial restraint, which means both limits on judicial authority to
create law and a focus of judicial attention on the facts of the particular
case. During the pre-Revolutionary period, the image of law as cus-
tom-identified but not created by courts-reinforced the image of a re-
9. Hearings on Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court before the
Senate CommL on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 69 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings].
10. J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY
OF RIGHTS 23-26 (1986); see also M. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 7-8 (1977) (where common law and natural law were interchangeably defined, the common
law became inseparable from the rights of individuals).
11. J. REID, supra note 10, at 27-33, 103-13; see also F. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM
12 (1985). The importance of property to liberty, defining property to include government-provided
benefits, is the central point of Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
12. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 10, at 1-4 &passim.
13. C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM
LEGAL REFORM 38-41, 73 (1981). Contrary strands in the debate criticized the common law as
biased, secretive, and chaotic. Id. at 57; see also W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAw 90 (1975) (legislatures protected liberty through exercise of popular sovereignty).
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strained judiciary. 14 The early 19th century witnessed a shift towards a
more instrumental view of the law and of the judicial role in adapting the
law to American needs. 15 Once this task was accomplished, however, the
judicial role (or at least its image) shifted back to a more modest task of
fitting the facts of a particular case within a framework of the formal
principles comprising the common law. 16
Judicial restraint and the courts' role as a protector of individual
rights have often conflicted. Judges were certainly not restrained when
they performed their task of protecting individual rights by narrowly in-
terpreting statutes (in derogation of the common law) and restraining the
administrative state. Therefore, when judges abandoned their hostility to
statutes and administrative agencies, it was easy to assume a change in
the judge's institutional role to one in which the balance had shifted to-
ward judicial restraint purged of any substantive agenda. But a more.
plausible view sees the change as having resulted from an altered concep-
tion of individual dignity and the institutions responsible for its protec-
tion and advancement. As legislatures and administrative agencies
became vehicles for implementing this new conception of individual dig-
nity, courts abandoned their appeal to common law principles, hitherto
advanced to restrain these institutions, and instead deferred to their judg-
ments. The substantive commitment to dignity values historically associ-
ated with the common law, however, persisted in the background and
surfaced in the judicial practice to question modem legislative and ad-
ministrative action.1 7 Justice Stevens' brand of judicial deference fits that
mold by deferring to modem decisionmakers unknown in the traditional
common law but aggressively questioning their action when individual
dignity values are theatened.' 8
The common law also had a particular version of factual delibera-
tion that has undergone a modem transformation. In the recent formal-
ist image of the common law, sticking to the facts has assured a
deferential judicial role that fits cases within predetermined formal cate-
gories. The Legal Realists' charge that judicial choice survived because
14. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 10, at 8; W. NELSON, supra note 13, at 19, 96; see also J. POCOCK,
THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 32 (1984).
15. W. NELSON, supra note 13, at 171-74 & passim. Legislatures also flexed their creative
muscle in the early 19th century, rather than purporting merely to discover or elaborate common
law rights. Id. at 90-92.
16. M. HoRwITz, supra note 10, at 253-66.
17. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 436 (1987)
(common law courts limit the regulatory state to protect rights).
18. See Stevens, Commentary, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 723, 726-27 (1988) (when the Constitution
was adopted, judges were lawmakers in the common law tradition).
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of the malleability of available doctrines19 did not entirely undermine this
image. Their charge simply made problematic the choice among avail-
able doctrines to be applied in light of determined facts. A more modem
conception of the judicial role permits judges to deliberate about the ends
embodied in the law as these ends are understood in the context of the
particular facts before a court.20 This self-conscious commitment to
shape the law by deliberating about facts revives a theme that was impor-
tant at the time of the Founding Fathers21 and was implicit in the notion
of law as custom-both immemorial and capable of adaptation to current
needs.22 Contemporary authors have tried to justify a context-specific
judicial role in shaping public values building on this earlier tradition.23
Although Justice Stevens shares this view of judicial deliberation,24 he
would not associate himself with all of the substantive values that advo-
cates of this approach might adopt.
I am not suggesting that the relationship among the principles of
deference, deliberation, and dignity values is logical or mechanical. The
relationship is not mandated by some higher principle, nor are these
principles linked to each other by cause and effect. Judges easily could
be deferential but not deliberative about the facts of a particular case.
For example, courts could generalize about deferring to agency rules
rather than develop the law on a case-by-case basis. Or judges could be
deliberative but not deferential, as when courts interpret statutes nar-
rowly on a selective case-by-case basis when they are in derogation of the
common law. And either a deferential/nondeliberative or nondeferen-
tial/deliberative frame of mind could be combined with a greater or
lesser commitment to individual dignity values. Further variations are
possible by distinguishing among the institutions to whom deference is
due and among dignity values worth preserving. The relationship among
19. See Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 468-73 (1988)
(reviewing L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)); Note, Relativistic Jurispru-
dence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1417, 1437-40 (1988).
20. See Miechelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 66-67 (1986)
(judges cannot wholly defer to other legal authority; the law and its applications are their responsi-
bility, with all applications justified in the context of the case at hand); Eskridge, Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1007-09 (1989) (public values or norms that
underlie our political community are important influences in statutory interpretation; constitutional
interpretation articulates and enforces these values).
21. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 31-55 (1985).
22. J. POCOCK, supra note 14, at 34-36. The adaptability of the common law was a major
theme in the codification debate. J. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON
LAW 25-26 (1984); C. COOK, supra note 13, at 103-04.
23. See, eg., Michelman, supra note 20, at 4, 76 & passim (practical reasoning and context-
specific dialogue should explain judicial norms).
24. Cf Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 190 (1986) (concurring in the judgment) ("a word is but
the skin of a living thought [but a] 'fact' may also have a life of its own").
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these values in Justice Stevens' opinions nonetheless makes sense as one
might understand a work of art.25 The pieces fit together, although not
inevitably. The common theme in Justice Stevens' jurisprudence is his
tendency to update and transform the traditional common law
commitment to judicial deference and individual dignity values through
a process of case-by-case deliberation.2 6
Justice Stevens' opinions hold special interest because of his effort to
develop a modem approach to statutory interpretation, one based on a
common law commitment to deliberation about the facts of the case and
individual dignity. In the traditional view, statutes were considered will-
ful intrusions into the common law. In contrast, most contemporary de-
bate about statutes accepts the view that they are expressions of popular
will, and contemporary courts generally accept democratic judgments.
The more fundamental challenge of statutes to the common law, how-
ever, is that they are framed in the language of generalized rules and
therefore rival decisionmaking by the common law process of case-by-
case analysis. Although judges have long since made their peace with
willful statutes, the problem of generalized versus case-by-case decision-
making still disturbs the common law mind. Justice Stevens' particular
contribution to statutory interpretation lies in his efforts to accommodate
modem deference to the generalized interpretation of legislative language
according to its plain meaning with a common law lawyer's commitment
to dignity values and a keen sense of the particularity of the case to
which the statute is being applied.
The rhetoric of Justice Stevens' opinions will receive more attention
than seems appropriate to a generation raised on Legal Realism and eco-
nomic analysis, or other models of law and the judicial process. To the
modem ear, the language of an opinion often appears as a facade behind
which the real decisionmaking criteria lurk. Maybe so. Justice Stevens'
commitment to individual dignity certainly explains many of his opin-
ions. But so does his rhetoric, which is eloquent on the subject of pro-
tecting individual rights. While I do not question that language is often
selectively chosen to justify results not openly expressed in the judicial
text, the language of an opinion is not simply a dependent variable. It
can be an expression of the author's real point of view and is, in any
event, the boundary within which thought is channeled and creativity is
developed. Justice Stevens' own words therefore will appear with some
25. Justice Stevens referred to the "art ofjudging" in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,
476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (dissenting).
26. Justice Stevens' commitment to a common law style ofjudging is reflected in his conclusion
to the Fairchild lecture at the University of Wisconsin Law School, citing Cardozo's tribute to
Holmes' THE COMMON LAW. Stevens, A Judge's Use of History, 1989 Wisc. L. REV. 223, 233.
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frequency to explain what he does as a judge. I will consider Justice
Stevens' Supreme Court opinions in two parts.2 7 Part II addresses the
general question of judicial restraint and creativity by a common law
judge on the Supreme Court. Part III then considers Justice Stevens'
approach to statutes.
II. COMMON LAW VALUES: DEFERENCE, DELIBERATION,
AND DIGNITY
It would be difficult to find a more forceful statement urging judicial
restraint than the following excerpt from a dissent by Justice Stevens:
Some students of the Court take for granted that our decisions repre-
sent the will of the judges rather than the will of the law. This dogma
may be the current fashion, but I remain convinced that such remarks
reflect a profound misunderstanding of the nature of our work. Unfor-
tunately, however, cynics-parading under the banner of legal real-
ism-are given a measure of credibility whenever the Court bases a
decision on its own notions of sound policy, rather than on what the
law commands. 28
Judicial willfulness must not displace what the law commands.
Although Justice Stevens admits the inevitability of "judicial legislation,"
he expects it to occur in "relatively rare instances" and then only "within
gaps," and not going "beyond the walls of the interstices."2 9 Those situa-
tions in which judges legislate should fit snugly within boundaries set by
others, not boundaries created by the courts themselves.
By contrast, Justice Stevens sounds anything but restrained when he
accuses the Court of "not appreciat[ing] the value of individual lib-
erty";30 when he asserts that "neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of
sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process Clause pro-
tects"; 31 and when he decides to protect a right of privacy, which in-
cludes "nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may cbnsider
offensive or immoral."' 32
27. The opinions cover the period from December 19, 1975, when he began serving as Supreme
Court Justice, to the summer of 1989, at the end of the 1988 Term. During this period, he wrote 885
opinions, not counting six as a Circuit Judge. Of these, 127 were in memorandum cases that were
not issued with per curiam opinions.
28. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 282-83 (1984) (dissenting); see
also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (concurring in the
judgment) ("We are not statesmen; we are judges.").
29. Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 283 n.12. Cf Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 229
(1981) (dissenting) (interstitial lawmaking in some circumstances, but not in this case).
30. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 358 (1985) (dissenting); see
also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 460 (1986) (dissenting) (Court does not "appreciate the value
of... liberty").
31. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (dissenting).
32. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (dissenting).
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How does Justice Stevens combine judicial restraint with a creative
judicial role?33 Section A of this part discusses Justice Stevens' concep-
tion of judicial restraint and section B explains his active commitment to
individual dignity. The principle that bridges these two ideas is delibera-
tion. Thus the discussion of judicial restraint concludes with Justice Ste-
vens' conception of judicial deliberation, and the discussion of individual
dignity begins with his commitment to deliberation in nonjudicial
contexts.
A. Judicial Restraint
Judicial restraint, as practiced by Justice Stevens, has two main at-
tributes. First, the Supreme Court in particular, and the federal courts in
general, should defer to other decisionmakers (section II.A.1.).34 Sec-
ond, courts should deliberate carefully about the facts of the case, avoid-
ing both overly broad generalizations and summary dispositions (section
II.A.2.).
1. Deference to Other Judicial Decisionmakers.
a. Deference by the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens urges the
Court to defer to other decisionmakers by broadly interpreting the in-
dependent state ground doctrine and relying on lower federal courts as
much as possible.
L Independent state ground. The independent state ground
doctrine prevents Supreme Court review of state court decisions resting
on state law grounds because no federal interest is implicated in such
cases. This doctrine has proved difficult to apply when state law is influ-
enced by federal law, as in cases in which the state equal protection and
due process clauses develop along lines similar to the United States
Constitution.
Justice Stevens has fought a losing battle against a narrow interpre-
tation of the independent state ground doctrine. In South Dakota v. Nev-
ille, 35 he argued:
Unless we have explicit notice that a provision of a State Constitution
is intended to be a mere shadow of the comparable provision in the
33. The combination of judicial restraint and creativity was observed early in Justice Stevens'
Supreme Court tenure. See Special Project, Justice Stevens: The First Three Terms, 32 VAND. L.
REv. 671, 734-37 (1979).
34. Cf Stevens, Legal Questions in Perspective, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) (expressing
surprise at how often the outcome of an appeal turns on who is the proper decisionmaker rather than
on what the proper decision should be); R. SICKELS, supra note 1, at 23-25, 29-30 (each institution
should do the work to which it is best suited).
35. 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (dissenting).
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Federal Constitution, it is presumptuous-if not paternalistic-for this
Court to make that assumption on its own.... [W]e cannot simply
presume that the highest court of the sovereign State will modify its
interpretation of its own law whenever we interpret comparable federal
law differently .... If a state-court judgment is premised on an ade-
quate state ground, that ground must be presumed independent unless
the state court suggests otherwise.
36
In Michigan v. Long, 37 the Supreme Court adopted the opposite pre-
sumption from that advocated by Justice Stevens. The Court established
a presumption that state court decisions were based on cognate federal
doctrine, rather than on an independent state ground, absent a "plain
statement" by the state court to the contrary.38 In dissent, Justice Ste-
vens expressed bafflement at the majority's suggestion that presuming
state law dependence on federal law showed "[riespect for the indepen-
dence of state courts. . .. "39 And in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, Justice
Stevens argued that the Court's presumption against an independent
state ground was an "inevitable intrusion upon the prerogatives of state
courts that can only provide a potential source of friction and thereby
threaten to undermine the respect on which we must depend for the
faithful and conscientious application of this Court's expositions of fed-
eral law." 4
Justice Stevens' approach to the independent state ground doctrine
took an unconventional turn in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 41
In Clover Leaf the state court had held that a state statute banning cer-
tain plastic but not paperboard containers failed the minimum rationality
test of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. Justice
Stevens saw only a state court's reevaluation of legislative facts about the
fit between legislative means and ends that differed from the state legisla-
ture's judgment. All that was at stake, therefore, was an allocation of
power within the state between the legislature and the courts, a matter
solely of concern to the state. He characterized the majority's position as
36. Id. at 568-69. Justice Stevens especially objected to the Court's apparent desire to "do its
part in curtailing the 'carnage caused by drunk drivers.'" Id. at 566; see also Montana v. Jackson,
460 U.S. 1030, 1032 (1983) (dissenting from grant of cert.) (judgment rested on adequate independ-
ent state grounds and therefore Court was without jurisdiction to vacate the judgment).
37. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (O'Connor, J., majority).
38. Id. at 1040-41.
39. Id. at 1072 (dissenting) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040). In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 571 (1987) (dissenting), Justice Stevens would have narrowly construed the Michigan v.
Long "plain statement" requirement: "It is denigrating enough to require the justices of the fifty
State Supreme Courts to include such a statement in their decisions, without demanding the same of
the 716 state appellate judges or all 20,000 state-court judges who decide cases that could conceiva-
bly be reviewed by this Court."
40. 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (dissenting).
41. 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (dissenting).
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"a newly discovered principle of federal constitutional law,"'42 stating
that he knew "of nothing in the Federal Constitution that prohibits a
State from giving lawmaking power to its courts. '43 This is one example
from a large number of cases in which Justice Stevens has urged the
Court to let state courts decide state law issues.44
ii. Relying on lower federal courts. The decisions of lower fed-
eral courts are another source of law to which Justice Stevens would de-
fer. His credo, expressing faith in the courts of appeals, is set forth in
Watt v. Alaska:
The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes. Among
the most significant is the increase in the importance of our courts of
appeals. Today they are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all
federal litigation.... The quality of work done by the courts of appeals
merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly
as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that if
we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their
work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant
certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our re-
view of a case may produce an answer different from theirs. In my
opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari. 45
Deference to lower federal courts is implemented by two doctrines: lim-
iting grants of certiorari and deferring to the expertise of lower federal
courts.
In numerous cases Justice Stevens argues for a denial of certiorari,
either because the issues are regional (rather than national) or they con-
cern harmless error. For example in Watt,46 Justice Stevens concluded
42. Id. at 477.
43. Id. at 479; see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 246-47
(1983) (concurring in the judgment).
44. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 32 (1985) (dissenting) (deny certiorari because
presume state court decided on state law grounds); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (dis-
senting) (error-correcting role varies depending on whether the Court reviews federal or state
courts); Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 970 (1984) (concurring) (state
court can violate federal standing requirements; if it does, federal court should refuse to decide the
case); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294-95 (1983) (majority) (same); Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 284-85 (1979) (concurring) (Court should not decide or order state to decide
state law issue); City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (dissenting) (Court should not
reverse on state law ground); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 583
(1977) (dissenting) (remand to state court to see whether there is an independent state ground).
45. 451 U.S. 259, 275 (1981) (concurring); cf United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 37 (1985)
(dissenting) ("a due respect for the work of our circuit judges ... warrants the conclusion that they
have already done exactly what Justice Brennan would have them do again"); United States v. Hast-
ing, 461 U.S. 499, 517 (1983) (concurring in judgment) ("insult to the Court of Appeals to imply, as
the Court does today, that it cannot be trusted with a task that would normally be conducted on
remand"); Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1977) (dissenting in part) (expressing general
sympathy for reversed lower court judges).
46. 451 U.S. at 273 (concurring).
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that the court of appeals should "provide the final answer to the unique
question of statutory construction," which did not involve a conflict
among the circuits but only an issue of regional interest (specifically, the
allocation of oil and gas lease revenues from wildlife refuges to political
units in Alaska).47 He noted especially that the Court's "expressions of
concern about the overburdened federal judiciary will ring with a hollow
echo" as long as it "creates unnecessary work for itself in this manner. '48
Harmless error analysis is also more appropriately left to lower
courts by denying certiorari. "If we have time to grant certiorari for the
sole purpose of correcting a highly technical and totally harmless error,"
Justice Stevens has stated, "one might reasonably (but incorrectly) infer
that we have more than enough time to dispatch our more important
business." 49
47. Id. at 274; see also Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 73 (1983) (dissenting)
("considerable importance in the semiarid lands of the West, but it is of much less importance to the
rest of the Nation"); cf Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 536 (1987) (dissenting) (nonrecurring
issue); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 12 (1982) (dissenting) (issue too local for Court's attention).
48. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. at 274.
49. Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 94 (1979) (dissenting); see also United States v.
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 476 (1986) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mail fraud case in which
defendants had been misjoined: "Undertaking a harmless-error analysis is perhaps the least useful
function that this Court can perform.... For that reason, a decision that a harmless-error inquiry is
required should lead us to a remand to the Court of Appeals, which is in a far better position than we
are to study the complete trial record with care."); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of
Geiger Enters., 454 U.S. 354, 363 (1982) (dissenting from grant of cert. and vacation' of court of
appeals decision) (debtor who had filed under old Bankruptcy Act should be permitted to obtain a
dismissal for purposes of refiling under Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978; to deny such consolidation
"is to impose unnecessary work on busy federal judges"); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782-83
(1978) (dissenting from grant of cert. in part and reversal in part) (In a suit to eliminate alleged cruel
and unusual punishment in Alabama's prison system the majority granted certiorari and held, on
eleventh amendment ground, that the State, absent consent to suit, must be struck from the list of
defendants. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the majority "did not question the propri-
ety of the injunctive relief," and striking the State from the defendants amounted to a correction of
harmless error.). Other cases in which Justice Stevens would have denied certiorari and deferred to
lower courts include: Alabama v. Davis, 446 U.S. 903, 904 (1980) (dissenting from grant of cert. and
vacation of judgment of court of appeals) (Court granted certiorari, vacated judgment of court of
appeals and directed that court to remand with instructions to vacate the order denying the petition
for habeas corpus. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the district court already had dis-
missed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, "[t]hus, there is no particular justification for this
Court's intervention."); School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667, 671 (1977) (dissenting from
grant of cert. and vacation of judgment of court of appeals) (court of appeals cannot properly do
anything on remand except reaffirm its judgment on well settled principles in its prior case law);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 115 (1976) (dissenting) (The district court dismissed a state pris-
oner's pro se complaint and the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The state's petition for
certiorari was granted and the Court found the prisoner's complaint was insufficient to state a cause
of action. Justice Stevens would have denied certiorari because "the Court seldom takes a case
merely to reaffirm settled law."); United States Dep't of Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14, 16
(1984) (dissenting) (After certiorari was granted, the Act at issue was amended so as to render the
issue moot. The cases were vacated and remanded because the cases presented issues not affected by
the amendment. Justice Stevens dissented and stated that "the new Act does not provide a basis for
1100 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:1087
Deference to the expertise of lower federal courts is another way the
Supreme Court can rely on other decisionmakers. A frequent justifica-
tion for Justice Stevens' holdings, analogous to denying certiorari when
the issues are regional, is the familiarity lower courts have of local condi-
tions. For example, Justice Stevens argued that "[t]he courts of appeals
are better qualified to decide questions of state law than is this Court,"
because the judges "formerly practiced" there and "confront state-law
issues on a regular basis."'50 And the court of appeals "is more familiar
with Maine's natural resources and with its legislation than we are,"151
which justifies deferring to their conclusion that the state violated the
interstate commerce clause. Similar claims are often made about the
knowledgeability of federal district courts.52
vacating the judgment."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 472-73 (1976) (concurring on dismissal
of grant of cert.) (case was properly dismissed on the grounds that "the state of the law applicable to
the facts disclosed by this record is sufficiently clear that the dismissal of the writ is a permissible
exercise").
50. California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 13 (1985)
(dissenting).
51. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 153 (1986) (dissenting); see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 696 (1986) (dissenting) ("defer to the views of the district and circuit judges
who are in a much better position to evaluate this speech than we are"); Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 827 (1976) (dissenting) ("Court of Appeals sitting
in Denver is just as able to evaluate as are we"); cf Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 108
S. Ct. 2194, 2203 (1988) (majority) ("the Court of Appeals is in a better position to evaluate the
significance of a violation than is this Court"); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (dis-
senting) ("[o]rderly procedure requires that the Court of Appeals address this issue before we actu-
ally decide the question"); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 444 (1985) (dissenting)
("I am more confident of the ability of the various Courts of Appeals to evaluate the problem of
disqualification motions and supervise the local bench and bar than I am of the accuracy of our own
more distant perspective.").
52. United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) (dissenting) (district judges are in a
better position to decide to dismiss with or without prejudice); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,
220 (1987) (dissenting) ("Moreover, a great many experienced and competent trial judges through-
out the Nation are fully capable of managing cases and supervising counsel in order to avoid the
problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges who are sometimes distracted by illogical
distinctions and irrelevant statistics."); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 107 (1986) (concurring-in
part and dissenting in part) ("I cannot say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are
well acquainted with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a
multimember electoral structure has caused black voters.., less opportunity than white voters to
elect representatives of their choice"); Webb v. Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 244 (1985) (majority)
(defer to district court decision on attorneys' fees); Karcher v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910, 910 (1984)
(concurring) (broad discretion in district court to shape remedies); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops
N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 236 (1979) (dissenting) (give trial judge latitude).
State court expertise also warrants reliance. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1127
(1983) (dissenting) ("[state] courts are far better equipped than this Court to make the kind of fac-
tual study that must precede such a determination"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 294 (1983)
(dissenting) ("In a fact-bound inquiry of this sort, the judgment of three levels of state courts, all of
which are better able to evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous informants in Bloomingdale,
Illinois, than we are, should be entitled to at least a presumption of accuracy.").
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b. Deference by federal courts in general The federal courts gen-
erally and, by inference the Supreme Court, should also limit their role
by applying the "passive virtues," such as mootness and ripeness, by re-
fusing to interpret federal law to displace state policy, and by relying on
agency interpretations.
i. Nonjusticiability. Justice Stevens frequently warns his col-
leagues against neglecting the doctrines of nonjusticiability. In United
States v. Sharpe, he found the issue moot and observed that
"[c]haracteristically, [mootness] is a matter the Court simply ignores."53
Justice Stevens is wary of the Court deciding hypothetical and moot
questions simply because they are "interesting. ' 54 Similarly, he believes
the Court should not address unripe issues "whenever we are persuaded
by reasons of expediency to engage in the business of giving legal
advice."55
it Interpreting federal law. Federal law also should be inter-
preted to prevent the federal courts from expanding their role. This ob-
jective is obviously served when the statute deals with federal court
jurisdiction. In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,'Inc. v. Thompson, 56 Jus-
tice Stevens wrote that a federal statute that did not create a federal rem-
edy did not support federal question jurisdiction merely because a state
incorporated federal policy into its own legal standards. No federal in-
terest was at stake in such cases. In Justice Stevens' view, it would
flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the
federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction
... solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a
53. 470 U.S. 675, 725 n.16 (1985) (dissenting) (Respondents were convicted of federal drug
offenses. The court of appeals reversed even though the respondents had escaped from prison and
were fugitives. Justice Stevens stated that "[a]s fugitives, these litigants should not be accorded
standing to advance their claim on appeal.").
54. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 723 (1986) (concurring in part and concurring in the result)
("No matter how interesting, or how clear their answers may appear to be, however, I would not
address the hypothetical questions... because they are not properly presented by the record in this
case.").
55. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (concurring in
the judgment); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
633 (1986) (concurring in the judgment) (not ripe); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (majority) (not ripe); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 623 (1982) (dissenting) ("hypothetical, and, at best, premature"); f Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 536 (1986) (majority) (individual school board member lacked
standing); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 613 (1985) (concurring in the
judgment) (no legal basis for claiming harm from action of EPA); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing
Center, 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980) (majority) (elderly residents were not deprived of a protectable
interest when nursing home decertified).
56. 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986) (majority).
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"rebuttable presumption" or a "proximate cause" under state law,
rather than a federal action under federal law.57
The interpretation of substantive federal law to defer to state policy
also limits the role of federal courts. The link between deciding not to
federalize an issue and reducing the burden on the federal courts is ex-
plicitly made by Justice Stevens in the following case that involved a
prior hearing claim under the due process clause: "The federal court is
not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel
decisions that are made daily by public agencies . .. "; and "ultimate
control of state personnel relationships is, and will remain, with the
States."5 8
Justice Stevens avoids federalizing issues by giving restrictive inter-
pretations to both the Constitution and federal statutes that might pre-
empt state law. Interpreting the Constitution and statutes to defer to
state policy directly limits the power of all branches of the federal gov-
ernment, and also indirectly restrains federal judicial power by minimiz-
ing the situations in which there is a federal interest for federal courts to
vindicate.
For example, Justice Stevens advocates interpreting the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution narrowly, to avoid
making a federal issue out of a state choice-of-law rule:
[T]he fact that the choice-of-law decision may be unsound as matter of
conflicts law does not necessarily implicate the federal concerns em-
bodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause .... [T]he Clause should
not invalidate a state court's choice of forum law unless that choice
threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infring-
ing upon the legitimate interests of another State.59
And in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, Justice Stevens argues that
"the Court's opinion [should] not be read as a decision to constitutional-
ize novel state-court developments in the common law whenever a liti-
gant can claim that another State connected to the litigation 'most likely'
would reach a different result."'60
57. Id.; cf United Ass'n of Journeyman v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 639 n.13 (1981) (dissent-
ing) (jurisdictional statute does not create federal common law; majority's opinion is "a striking
example of the easy way in which this Court enlarges the power of the Federal Government-and
the Federal Judiciary in particular-at the expense of the States").
58. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 350 n.14 (1976) (majority).
59. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (concurring in the judgment) (legal
issue is whether to stack uninsured motorist coverage on three vehicles to cover accident involving
one vehicle; parties were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident, but decedent worked in
Minnesota and defendant moved to Minnesota after the accident).
60. 472 U.S. 797, 845 (1985) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (issue involved paying
interest to class on "suspense" royalties); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (majority).
Hall involved a suit by a California resident against the State of Nevada in a California court.
Nevada claimed sovereign immunity. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that neither full faith
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Justice Stevens adopts a similarly restrained stance in interstate
commerce clause cases. For example, in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
Bair, 61 a state used a one-factor formula for measuring the tax base of an
interstate business. Justice Stevens refused to find a national policy
favoring uniform tax rules. In response to the argument that the one-
factor formula departed from the three-factor formula used by a majority
of states, he denied any national interest in subordinating the interests of
one state.62
Justice Stevens is also reluctant to find a federal interest in the rela-
tionship of federal statutes to state law. He therefore rejected the view
that state law was "borrowed" by the federal law as "a sensible form of
'interstitial law making,'" and instead argued that state law should be
applied "because [the courts] were directed to do so by the Congress of
the United States [in the Rules of Decision Act]. ' 63
This perspective on the relationship of federal statutes to state law
carries with full force over to the cases involving potential federal statu-
tory preemption of state eligibility rules for unemployment compensa-
tion. Two cases had opposite substantive effects: In one state law
allowed, and in the other it prohibited, eligibility.64 Justice Stevens also
has rejected preemption of state by federal law in numerous other cases.65
and credit nor constitutional structure required California to apply Nevada immunity law. Finding
a federal interest in this case would, in his view, have been a "real intrusion on the sovereignty of the
States." Id. at 426-27.
61. 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978) (majority).
62. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S. Ct. 582, 593 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (state tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce because overtaxation of out-
going telephone calls is compensated for by undertaxation of incoming calls); cf. California Bd. of
Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2228 (1989) (majority) (intergovernmental immunity
doctrine does not prohibit state taxation of private parties with whom the United States does busi-
ness, even though economic burden falls on the United States, absent discrimination); Davis v. Mich-
igan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1509-12 (1989) (dissenting) (intergovernmental immunity
doctrine not violated by exempting retired state employees from tax, when all other retirees, includ-
ing federal employees, are taxed).
63. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172-73 (1983) (dissenting).
But cf County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 256-57 (1985) (concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the need to apply federal law when federal
policy so requires).
64. Compare New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 527 (1979)
(plurality) (strikers eligible) with Baker v. General Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621, 638 (1986) (major-
ity) (ineligible if employees finance strike).
65. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989) (majority) (state tax
not preempted); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1988) (dissenting) (ob-
jecting to the Court's invocation of "unique federal interest" to preempt state tort law, thereby
giving tort immunity to federal contractors); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
1877, 1885 (1988) (majority) (state tort 'remedy not preempted by federal labor law); California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987) (dissenting) (state prohibition of gam-
bling on Indian reservation not preempted); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1981) (dis-
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i&L Relying on agencies. Another example of federal court def-
erence appeared in Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 66 Justice Stevens' opinion
adopted what one commentator called "a strong formulation of the con-
cept of deference" to administrative agencies-one that "generat[ed] a
powerful new image of the appropriate functions of court and agency in
the administrative state."' 67 According to Justice Stevens, where Con-
gress has not "directly addressed the precise question at issue" and "did
not actually have an intent regarding the [litigated issue]," the reviewing
court should defer to the agency's decision, as long as it represents a
reasonable policy choice.68 By confining judicial rejection of agency in-
terpretations to cases in which specific legislative intent contradicts the
agency, judicial power is significantly curtailed. 69
senting) (federal law dealing with insurance for members of Armed Forces does not preempt state
law creating constructive trust for insured's minor children); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am nevertheless troubled by one
aspect of the case [preemption] that seems to trouble none of my colleagues"); cf Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 700 n.2 (1985) (dissenting) (federal securities law should not be
applied to the purchase of 100% ownership, in part because inferring a federal cause of action would
"displace state authority"); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 489 n.4 (1981) (concurring in the judg-
ment) (Court should not interpret a statute to shift power from the states to the federal government;
"in itself this case is not terribly important, but it is another example of the easy way in which the
Executive Branch and this Court cooperate in the continuing transfer of governmental responsibility
from the States to the federal sovereign"); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
157 (1980) (dissenting) (state tax not preempted).
Where the federal statute clearly preempts state law, however, there is no leeway to interpret
the law to prevent preemption. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880-81 (1976)
(dissenting) (Constitution does not prevent federal law from requiring states to pay minimum wage);
Stevens, supra note 18, at 725-26. Federal agency rate regulations also preempt state law, where
there is a clear conflict between state and federal agencies and prior case precedent preempting state
law is indistinguishable. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 108 S. Ct.
2428, 2439-42 (1988) (majority) (a state may not use its jurisdiction over retail rates to circumvent
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) rate-setting between a nuclear power producer and
a wholesaler power company purchaser; FERC determination of reasonable rates preempts inquiry
by the Mississippi Public Service Commission).
66. 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984) (Environmental Protection Agency regulation allowing states to
adopt a "plant wide" definition of "stationary source" as used in the Clean Air Act Amendment was
permissible construction of the statute).
67. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 457 (1989).
68. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
69. There has been some disagreement over exactly how much deference Chevron requires,
specifically on the question of how much effort the judge must initially expend to determine legisla-
tive intent. Farina, supra note 67, at 460 n.42 (querying whether court should first use traditional
tools of interpretation); id. at 462 n.51 (asking if court should first determine if there is plain mean-
ing which precludes reliance on agency interpretation). Concerning Justice Stevens' view, whatever
others may think of his Chevron opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 158-64.
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2. Judicial Deliberation: Avoiding Generality and Summary Dis-
position. Judicial restraint, for Justice Stevens, is a matter of limiting
the scope of judicial decisions, as well as deferring to other deci-
sionmakers. The act of judging is a case-by-case deliberative process,
which requires avoiding both overbroad generalizations and summary
dispositions. 70 This approach not only limits the scope of a decision by
implementing judicial restraint values, but also serves individual dignity
values by showing respect for the individuality of the litigant's case.
Justice Stevens extols the virtues of case-by-case deliberation and
warns against the hazards of hypothetical rulemaking:
When we follow our traditional practice of adjudicating difficult and
novel constitutional questions only in concrete factual situations, the
adjudications tend to be crafted with greater wisdom. Hypothetical,
rulings are inherently treacherous and prone to lead us into unforeseen
errors; they are qualitatively less reliable than the products of case-by-
case adjudication.71
Deliberation on a question over time also winnows out the unnecessary
and discordant elements of that doctrine and thus preserves "whatever is
pure and sound and fine."'72
A belief in the importance of case-by-case deliberation pervades Jus-
tice Stevens' decisions. Although this decisionmaking process is quintes-
sentially a common law procesS, 73 it also is applicable to constitutional74
and statutory adjudication:
The question whether "emotional injury" is cognizable under the [Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act] is not necessarily an abstract point of
law or a pure question of statutory construction that might be answer-
70. Avoiding premature decisions also improves judicial deliberation. For example, in New
York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 249-51 (1984) (concurring in dismissal of cert.), Justice Stevens
justifies his vote to dismiss a petition for certiorari after oral argument to avoid premature considera-
tion of constitutional questions, when the court of appeals reasoning was unclear.
71. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 780-81 (1982) (concurring in the judgment).
72. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400-01 (1985) (dissenting) ("The only true rules gov-
erning search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-
case adjudication."); see also id. at 399 ("Premature resolution of the novel question presented has
stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles.").
73. Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 277, 290-91 (1986); see also
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984) (majority) ("[T]he
content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the
evolutionary process of common-law adjudication."); cf. R. SICKELS, supra note 1, at 150 ("Ste-
vens's 'legislative' facts are commonsensical rather jhan statistical, by and large, more the common-
law judge's qualitative review of the lessons of institutional and personal experience than the social-
scientific data and generalizations of the legal realist.").
74. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 780-81 (avoiding hypothetical ruling on constitutionality of state child
pornography statute); see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 457 (1979) (dissenting from grant of cert.)
("[J]udicial construction of the words 'life, liberty, or property' is not simply a matter of applying the
precepts of logic to accepted premises. Rather, it is experience and judgment that have breathed life
into the Court's process of constitutional adjudication.").
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able without exacting scrutiny of the facts of the case .... As in other
areas of law, broad pronouncements in this area may have to bow to
the precise application of developing legal principles to the particular
facts at hand.75
Similarly, Justice Stevens questions the imposition of penalties on law-
yers for frivolous claims because such penalties could dampen their con-
tribution to the incremental case-by-case deliberative process by which
the law develops. 76
Realistic consideration of the facts of a case is always a critical part
of Justice Stevens' analysis. In deciding whether the Comptroller Gen-
eral possesses too much legislative power, Justice Stevens relied on the
power actually exercised by the Comptroller General rather than focus-
ing on the dormant congressional power of removal.7 7 And the special
historical circumstances surrounding the legislation affecting President
Nixon determined whether the statute was a bill of attainder.78 Even the
Supreme Court's own rules about the size of filed documents must be
subject to exceptions because "[n]o set of procedural rules can anticipate
every problem that may arise in litigation. '79
Justice Stevens' commitment to case-by-case deliberation makes him
suspicious of judicial generalities, the best known example of which is his
insistence that there is a single equal protection clause and not a variety
of multi-tiered standards:80
75. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1987) (majority); see also
United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (1988) (concurring in the judgment) (statutory
definition of "involuntary servitude" should be defined by "common-law tradition of case-by-case
adjudication"); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 975 (1982) (concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[a]s in so many areas of the law, it is important to consider each case individually");
cf City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 167 (1988) (dissenting) ("poor judicial practice[ ] to
use this case as a bulldozer to reshape 'a legal landscape whose contours are in a state of evolving
definition and uncertainty' ") See also Stevens, supra note 26, at 235 (original intent is the begin-
ning, not the end, of a dispassionate attempt to understand any rule of law).
76. Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071-72 (1985) (concurring).
77. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 738, 750 (1986) (concurring in the judgment),
78. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 486 (1977) (concurring).
79. Professional Positioners, Inc. v. T.P. Laboratories, Inc., 466 U.S. 967, 967-68 (1984)
(dissenting).
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985) (concurring)
(arguing that the Court's decisional process cannot be adequately explained by applying the three or
two-tiered standard of review); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (concurring) ("[Tihe two-
tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding
cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."); see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 749 (1983)
(concurring) ("There is only one equal Protection Clause."). See generally Note, Justice Stevens'
Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1162-64 (1987) (arguing that Justice Ste-
vens' relevance inquiry, which requires examining historical circumstances contributing to differ-
ences among groups, may serve as a more effective remedy to discrimination than the two-tiered
analysis).
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In cases presenting issues under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court often plunges directly into a discussion of the "level of scrutiny"
that will be used to review state action that affects different classes of
persons differently. Unfortunately that analysis may do more to bbfus-
cate than to clarify the inquiry. This case suggests that a better start-
ing point may be a careful identification of the character of the federal
interest that is implicated by the State's discriminatory classification.8 1
He makes a similar point about the "standards of review" under due
process: "This is not a case where it is particularly helpful to begin by
determining the 'proper' standard of review, as if the result of that pre-
liminary activity would somehow lighten the Court's duty to decide this
case."
8 2
Justice Stevens also makes similar objections to adopting other catch
phrases in constitutional adjudication, such as "compelling state inter-
est". and "least restrictive means,"'8 3 "public forum"8 4 and "commercial
speech"85 and, more generally, Justice Stevens faults courts for treating
statements in prior cases with the same respect accorded to general
rules.86 He argues that "[tihe primary responsibility for line-drawing...
is vested in the legislature .... Any difficulty courts may encounter [in
distinguishing between two cases] simply reflects that the factual
predicate to these cases is itself complicated. 8s7 Rejection of judicial
81. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 973 (1982) (concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
82. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 102 (1987) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1026 (1989)
(concurring).
84. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 833 (1985) (dissenting) (skeptical
of "public fora" category, as with multi-tiered equal protection).
85. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (concurring in judgment)
(commercial speech too rigid a category; danger that rigid categorization will suppress speech).
86. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 29 (1986) (dissenting) (criticizing
majority for taking its "own verbal formulation seriously"); cf United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117, 154 (1980) (dissenting) ("wooden extrapolation from a rationale").
87. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3017
(1989) (concurring in the judgment).
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generality was also urged by him in numerous other opinions,88 as well as
in law review articles.89
In Justice Stevens' view, limits on generality cannot be carried so far
that they violate equal protection concerns. A judge must frame a
decision with an eye towards how it will affect others: An opinion has a
"forward-looking function which reaches far beyond the cause in hand
... cast[ing] its shadow before... [and] serv[ing] as a steadying factor
which aids reckonability." 90 Within that constraint, however, the scope
88. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (1989) (major-
ity) (meaning of "actual malice" and "reckless disregard" given content through case-by-case adjudi-
cation, not readily captured in "one infallible definition"); Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiala v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1987) (majority) (refusing to adopt
new rule which would require the application of Hague Convention procedures with regard to evi-
dence gathering whenever available); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767-68 (1987) (dissent-
ing) (unwilling to decide that preventive detention is never proper during a crisis); Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 417 (1987) (dissenting) ("because this is the first case of this kind that the
Court has reviewed, I am hesitant to adopt an absolute rule invalidating all such agreements"); Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 190-91 (1986) (concurring in thejudgment) (refusing to generalize about
what should be done if lawyer thinks client testimony is perjured); Heckler v. Community Health
Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984) (majority) (refusing to say that the government is never estopped);
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp,, 467 U.S. 752, 778, 795-96 (1984) (dissenting) (de-
cide whether parent-subsidiary conspiracy on case-by-case basis); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983) (majority) (no "litmus-paper test" for deciding constitutional issue; "analytical pro-
cess that parallels its work in ordinary litigation"); Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1983) (concurring) ("general language of the Sherman Act [given concrete
meaning] by a process of case-by-case adjudication"); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100
(1984) (majority) (no per se rule establishing that horizontal price fixing and output limitation are
anti-competitive); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 76 (1978) (concurring) (some
extraterritoriality effects might be bad); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 617 (1976)
(concurring in thejudgment) (judge can protect defendant without gagging press in this case, but not
necessarily in all cases); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2797 (1988)
(concurring in the judgment) (too many variables to justify fresh interpretation of prior cases with-
out focusing on particular facts); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986)
(dissenting) (objecting to "a reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art ofjudging"); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (court should not
engage in "sterile generalization" when analyzing the scope of the Arbitration Act); United Parcel
Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 72 (1981) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (majority
should limit its reasoning to the narrow question presented); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95-
96 (1977) (concurring) (language of test less important than the factors considered).
Sometimes judicial restraint by avoiding judicial generality conflicts with judicial restraint by
deferring to other decisionmakers. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332,
354 (1982) (majority), Justice Stevens argued that by "articulating [per se antitrust] rules of law with
some clarity and by adhering to rules that are justified in their general application ... we enhance
the legislative prerogative to amend the law."
89. Stevens, Judicial Restraint, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 437, 447-48 (1985) ("glittering general-
ity"); Stevens, Some Thoughts About a General Rule, I ARIz. L. REv. 599, 604-05 (1979) (general
rule fragile); see also Stevens, Mr. Justice Roberts, in MR. JUSTICE 319, 324, 330-34 (P. Kurland &
A. Dunham eds. 1964) (faculty of judgment, not logical application of unbending principle).
90. County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 940 n.6 (1985) (dissenting) (quoting K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 26 (1960)).
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of the decision should be narrowed so that it draws as much sustenance
as possible from the particularities of the litigated issue.
Closely related to the problem of overly broad generality is Justice
Stevens' objection to the Court deciding hypothetical cases. "Specula-
tion about hypothetical cases illuminates the discussion in a classroom,
but it is evidence and historical fact that provide the most illumination in
a courtroom." 91 In a typically common law fashion, he is wary of dis-
cussing hypothetical cases that pose "interesting and potentially difficult
philosophical puzzles" but do not have "any significant relationship to
real world decisions."' 92 He argues that a lack of restraint in going "be-
yond what is necessary to decide the case ... encourage[s] the perception
that [the Court] is pursuing its own notions of wise social policy, rather
than adhering to its judicial role."'93
Justice Stevens frequently objects to the Court deciding an issue not
specified in the grant of certiorari.94 In Berkemer v. McCarty, he ob-
served that the Court was "reaching out to decide a question not passed
upon below and unnecessary to the judgment" because the "answer to
the question upon which we granted review is so clear under our settled
precedents that the majority-its appetite for deciding constitutional
questions only whetted-is driven to serve up a more delectable issue to
satiate it.''95
91. Brown Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 586 (1986)
(dissenting); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 509 (1987) (concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("partially advisory"); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 462 (1985)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for placing "a higher value on the
rendition of a volunteered advisory opinion than on the virtues of judicial restraint"); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 371 (1985) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Court has unnecessa-
rily and inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question"); Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 436 (1985) (concurring in the judgment) ("unnecessary" to consider much of what major-
ity did consider in rendering opinion); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 590
(1984) (concurring in the judgment) ("Court's discussion ... is wholly advisory"); Oregon v. Ken-
nedy, 456 U.S. 667, 681 (1982) (concurring in the judgment) ("exercise in law-making... wholly
unnecessary"); Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 279 (1982) (concurring in part) (Court made "unneces-
sary" observation); Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715, 732 (1980) (dissenting) (resolution of issue is "of
no immediate consequence" to parties).
92. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (1988) (concurring in the judgment).
93. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984) (concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(majority) (Justice Holmes' advisory opinion is "uncharacteristic").
94. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1986) (concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("I dissent from the Court's disposition of the question that was not presented by
the certiorari petition."); Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 896 (1984) (concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (award of attorney's fees not in grant of certiorari and therefore
should not have been reversed); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (concurring) (Court
cannot decide what is not "fairly subsumed within the question presented by the petition for
certiorari").
95. 468 U.S. 420, 445-46 (1984) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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This reluctance to decide issues not contained in the petition for
certiorari is apparently a source of contention within the Court. In Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 96 Justice Stevens' willingness to decide an issue not
raised in the petition was commented on specifically by Chief Justice
Burger 97 and drew a pointed response from Justice Stevens. His response
explained that the usual concerns about judicial restraint were inapplica-
ble because the defending party, not the Court, had injected the issue into
the case, and the issue had been fully argued.98
Avoiding over broad generalizations focuses a judge's attention on
the facts of the particular case. Avoiding summary disposition is equally
important, because it assures that the attention paid to the facts will be
meaningful. Summary dispositions increase the risk of mistake,99 and
weaken judicial discipline and accountability. 0 Justice Stevens there-
fore rejects a suggestion that briefs on the merits must be filed before
deciding cases summarily because that practice would "regularize and
expand" summary decisions.101
B. Dignity Goals
Justice Stevens' practice of judicial restraint coexists with a deep
commitment to individual dignity values. This section examines his con-
ception of individual dignity and how courts should protect and nurture
it. Section 1 explains how deliberation itself has substantive value, by
96. 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (concurring).
97. Id. at 115 & nn.1 & 2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 108-11. Justice Stevens' self-consciousness about explaining judicial restraint also
appears in Novack Investment Co. v. Setser, 454 U.S. 1064, 1064 (1981) (concurring) (explaining
why denial of certiorari appropriate), and New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 249-51 (1984) (con-
curring) (explaining why he agreed with dismissal of writ of certiorari after oral argument).
99. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1984) (dissenting from
grant of cert. and summary vacation of lower court's judgment) ("Whenever this Court acts summa-
rily, there is an increased risk that it will make a mistake. Without the benefit of full briefs and oral
argument, an important issue may escape our attention."); see also Idaho Dep't of Employment v.
Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 104 (1977) (dissenting in part) (risk of error from summary decision); Brennan
v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1977) (dissenting) ("hasty action will unfortunately lead to
unnecessary work by already overburdened Circuit Judges").
100. County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 940 (1985) (dissenting). In the same vein, he
objects to the secrecy of unpublished court of appeals opinions. Id. at 938; cf Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 398 (1988) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A matter as
important as the constitutionality of a state statute should not be decided on the basis of an advo-
cate's concession during oral argument"); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 249 (1980) (con-
curring in judgment) ("The disposition of a novel and important question of federal jurisdiction in a
footnote will lend support to the notion that federal courts have a 'carte blanche' authorizing judicial
supervision of almost everything that the Executive Branch of Government may do."); Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 181-82 n.* (1977) (dissenting) (a question not ruled on or brought to atten-
tion of the court is not precedent); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality) (judge's
decision in death case must "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion").
101. Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 49 (1982) (concurring).
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assuring respectful judgment about the claims made by participants in
the deliberative process. Individual dignity is thereby nurtured in nonju-
dicial as well as judicial settings. Section 2 describes the content of Jus-
tice Stevens' conception of individual dignity and how judicial restraint
serves individual dignity values.
1. Political Deliberation. The capacity for deliberation is not a
judicial monopoly. Its root meaning-weighing matters10 2 to make judg-
ments-embodies an ideal of rationality that Justice Stevens equates with
the rule of law, and contrasts with such alternative frames of mind as
"caprice," 0 3 "emotion,"'04 "expression of the community's outrage,"' 10 5
and "subjective reactions. °10 6 Both government and private deliberative
rationality are therefore objectives that the law encourages in a wide vari-
ety of contexts, although with different shades of meaning and
intensity. 10 7
For example, Justice Stevens believes that nonjudicial governmental
action through referenda cannot threaten individual property rights as
"government by caprice," but instead should be based "on the merits by
reference to articulable rules."108 The value of rational deliberation also
extends to private decisionmaking. The first amendment implements this
102. OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 413-14 (2d ed. 1989) (from the Latin libra, a balance, a
pair of scales, and deliberare, to weigh well).
103. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 (plurality) (judicial decision in death case must "be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion"); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426
U.S. 668, 690, 692-93 (1976) (dissenting) (public referenda about the use of a person's property
should not impose "government by caprice," but instead should be based "on the merits by reference
to articulable rules").
104. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358.
105. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,469 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("a
rule of law as judges normally understand such rules" is contrasted with "an expression of the
community's outrage" by a jury in passing a death sentence).
106. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (dissenting) (objecting to "guilt or inno-
cence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity trial [being] determined primarily by individual jurors'
subjective reactions to the materials in question rather than by the predictable application of rules of
law").
107. In view of Justice Stevens' commitment to the rule of law and rationality, especially in
death penalty cases (Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358), an explanation is required for why the death penalty
must be conditioned on the jury's "expression of outrage." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469. Justice Ste-
vens probably expects the twelve jurors to deliberate hedged by procedural safeguards about what
behavior deserves their outrage. See, eg., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2336 (1988) (dis-
senting) (stating that jury must be given the authority to hear and must be allowed to give independ-
ent weight to evidence based upon "the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the
evidence proferred"). But that explanation is only partially satisfying. Why is the result still de-
scribed, without approbation, as an expression of outrage, rather than rational deliberation? Death
may indeed be different, to be imposed only if the community is willing to take responsibility by
indulging an emotion that would normally be banished from legal decisions and then only if such
primal rage can survive the deliberative safeguards erected by the law.
108. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 690, 692-93 (1976) (dissenting).
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principle by prohibiting state action that discourages private delibera-
tion.109 The importance of private deliberation can also justify state ac-
tion, as when the state promotes discussion between parent and child
about abortion, even though the child's abortion decision itself must be
accepted.110 And inadequacies in the private deliberation process, in-
volving imbalances in language facility or financial resources, may result
in interpreting a treaty to favor a disadvantaged party,I ' or finding that
contractual waivers of rights violate due process."12 Although there is
also a legitimate .teaching role for the government to play in the private
deliberative process, it must act rationally. Symbolic government action,
for example, is a permissible form of teaching, but not if it "irrational[ly]
and perverse[ly]" harms the person being taught.113
The law's primary concern with rationality in the nonjudicial con-
text, however, focuses on legislative and administrative decisionmaking.
109. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (1989) (major-
ity) ("profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the first amend-
ment"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582-83 (1980) (concurring) (a
"watershed case" because the Court squarely held that acquisition of newsworthy matter is pro-
tected under the first amendment, even though it protected the most powerful voices in the cOmmu-
nity); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1978) (dissenting) (state interference with press
access to jail is questionable because access promotes an informed citizenry). Justice Stevens' com-
mitment to deliberation can be traced to his student days, where he authored an article objecting to a
peace march as not conducive to "constructive interchange of thought." R. SIcKELS, supra note 1,
at 184 n.87 (quoting Peace Strikes Are Silly, DAILY MAROON, Apr. 18, 1940, at 4).
110. Justice Stevens would have permitted parental notice before an abortion because it is a
"procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant young woman exercise as wisely as
possible her right to make the abortion decision." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424 (1981)
(concurring). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104 (1976) (concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (advice and moral support of a parent "helping a pregnant distressed child to
make and implement a correct decision"); cf. McCoy v. Court of Appeals, Dist. 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895,
1904 (1988) (majority) (state can require a lawyer appointed for an indigent accused criminal to
explain to the court why an appeal is not meritorious, in part because preparation of a written
explanation might uncover arguments favoring the accused).
111. Compare Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 667 n.10 (1979) (majority) (in the 1900s Indians did not understand English well;
Treaty interpreted in their favor) with Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473
U.S. 793, 772 (1985) (majority) (Indians understood English well and had lawyer; Treaty therefore
can be interpreted adversely to Indians).
112. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,487-90 (1985) (dissenting) (waiver of objec-
tion to jurisdiction in contract was violation of Due Process clause when provision was boilerplate
insisted on by dominant financial party).
113. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977) (concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (footnotes omitted):
[The State's] central argument is that the statute has the important symbolic effect of com-
municating disapproval of sexual activity by minors. In essence, therefore, the statute is
defended as a form of propaganda, rather than a regulation of behavior.
Although the State may properly perform a teaching function, it seems to me that an
attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is an unacceptable means of convey-
ing a message that is otherwise legitimate. The propaganda technique used in this case
significantly increases the risk of unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease, It is as though
1112
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As the remainder of this section explains, Justice Stevens would impose
higher rationality standards on legislatures and agencies than conven-
tional doctrine requires.
a. Legislative rationality. - Rationality, in its most fully developed
form, and as advocated by Justice Stevens, is concerned with substantive
ends as well as means:
[I] have always asked myself whether I could find a "rational basis" for
the classification at issue. The term "rational," of course, includes a
requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that
the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that tran-
scends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the
word "rational"--for me at least-includes elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sover-
eign's duty to govern impartially. 114
Legislative rationality also has a procedural side to it: "For just as
procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decisionmak-
ing in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving the
impartial character of the legislative process." '11s
The central procedural norm is participation, which imposes greater
demands on legislatures, in Justice Stevens' view, than traditiohal doc-
trine requires. The traditional view is that the "Constitution does not
grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public
bodies making decisions of policy. 116 But Justice Stevens dissented in a
case applying that principle, stating that the first amendment prohibited
giving "only one speaker a realistic opportunity to present its views to
a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety
helmets.
See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 386 (1985) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(allowing search of student's purse teaches "a curious moral for the Nation's youth").
114. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (concurring) (empha-
sis added) (footnotes deleted) (concluding that requiring annual special use permit for group home
for mildly retarded not rationally based); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481,
2494 (1988) (dissenting) (quoting a related passage of Cleburne) (Court allowed special fee for bus-
ing to stand despite apparently discriminatory effect on poorer students and school districts).
Justice Stevens believes that majorities are not likely to hurt themselves. Attorney General v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (dissenting) ("[iln a democracy the majority will seldom treat
itself unfairly"); cf. Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (concurring) (enough
males are hurt by a classification favoring veterans to refute charge of sex bias). His optimism about
programs helping a small group is not entirely consistent with his concern about legislative delibera-
tion, because it pays too little attention to the ability of a small group to capture control of legisla-
tion. It undoubtedly reflects another strain in his opinions, that politics must generally be trusted.
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 648-49 (1982) (dissenting) (the possibility of some discriminatory
intent by legislators to achieve political advantage must be tolerated).
115. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549 (1980) (dissenting).
116. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., majority).
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state officials.., by reference to the identity of the speaker," rather than
the time, place and means of communication.1 17
The substantive and procedural requirements for legislative rational-
ity merge for Justice Stevens in his distinctive conception of vicarious
judicial participation. Legislative rationality depends on identifying le-
gitimate legislative goals by hypothesizing what a "rational member of
th[e] disadvantaged class" would approve. 118 For example, the handi-
capped might accept driving limits but not limits on where they may
live.1 19 The court, in effect, "participates" on behalf of the disadvantaged
group in the legislative process. Vicarious judicial "participation" is not,
however, a matter of replicating "interests" that might be demanded by
the group. The group's wishes must be "rational"-a requirement that
implies limits to the goals the law will recognize. Just as legislative ra-
tionality must be tested against a substantive judicial conception of legiti-
macy, 120 so the substantive concerns of the rational member of the
disadvantaged group are passed through a judicial filter.
Justice Stevens extensively develops these norms in his approach to
the equal protection clause. Legislation must be impartial,12' which at
the very least means freedom from traditional bias. The evil of tradi-
tional bias lies in the thoughtless application of unexamined points of
view to the disadvantaged group. But not every tradition on which
legislation is based can be reexamined whenever the legislature acts.
Moreover, some of these traditions are desirable. 122 Objections to tradi-
tional bias therefore imply a substantive choice between "legitimate" and
"illegitimate" biases, a choice that is already implicated in Justice Ste-
vens' view that rationality includes notions of legitimacy.12 3 The over-
arching substantive criterion that identifies situations requiring more
thoughtful legislative attention is the requirement of "equal respect."' 2 4
Justice Stevens has applied this requirement to conclude that, on the
117. Id. at 300-01 ("The Minnesota statute places a significant restraint on [free competition of
ideas] by regulating the communication that may take place between the government and those
-governed.").
118. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 n.12.
119. Id at 454.
120. Id.
121. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533, 548 (1980) (dissenting); Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (concurring); see also
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 307-08 (1977) (dissenting) (ex post facto clause concerned not only
with fair notice, but with bad motive, provides protection against "improperly motivated or capri-
cious legislation," ensuring that "the sovereign will govern impartially").
122. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual" is an ethical tradition to be followed).
123. See supra text accompanying note 114.
124. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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facts of the particular case, disfavoring the mentally retarded,12 5 burden-
ing illegitimates, 126 harming the poor, 127 and classifying on the basis of
race128 and sex (including anti-male bias) 129 violate the government's
duty to govern impartially.
Justice Stevens' argument that there is only one equal protection
clause130 follows from his view that government can inflict harm only as
a result of a thoughtful legislative process. There are no mechanical for-
mulae for simplifying the judicial task of deciding whether legislative ac-
tion is rational-that is, legitimate. Therefore, irrational legislative
behavior that affects groups not traditionally considered "suspect"
classes might be struck down, whereas rational legislative behavior that
deals with "suspect" groups might be upheld. A racial classification that
is well thought out, for example, can be sustained.131 And discrimination
based on sex can be upheld if it is based on reasoned distinctions
grounded in fact and not on traditional bias.132 By contrast, the poor,
125. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,454 (1985) (concurring) (arguing
that an "impartial lawmaker" could rationally vote to give the mentally retarded special treatment
under certain circumstances, but in the instant case the mentally retarded did not receive impartial
treatment).
126. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 523 (1976) (dissenting) ("tradition of thinking of illegiti-
mates as less deserving persons than legitimates").
127. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978) (concurring in the judgment), the State
prohibited marriage without court approval by someone with a support obligation unless he could
show that support was being provided. Although marriage was not immune from evenhanded regu-
lation, a provision that the "rich may marry and the poor may not" is "totally unprecedented, as
well as inconsistent with our tradition of administering justice equally to the rich and to the poor."
Id. at 404 (footnote omitted).
128. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-49 (1980) (dissenting) (although the Due Process
Clause may not contain an absolute prohibition against statutory classification based on race, it does
act as a procedural safeguard "preserving the impartial character of the legislative process").
129. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 501 (1981) (dissenting) (statutory rape law
applying only to males reflects "traditional attitudes towards male-female relationships" by making
males more guilty); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 154 (1980) (concurring in the
judgment); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (concurring in the judgment) ("accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(concurring) ("remnant of the now almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against
males in this age bracket").
130. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
131. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (dissenting) ("race is not always
irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking"; classification in this case served a valid public
purpose, and given its narrow breath, should be upheld); see also New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-86 (1979) (majority) (the statistics in the case fail to prove that the Transit
Authority violated Title VII by prohibiting its employees from using methadone).
132. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (majority) (biological father status not enough to
establish rights to child when there is no personal or financial relationship); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 403 (1979) (dissenting) (goes "beyond a merely reflexive rejection of gender-based
distinctions" to uphold burden on noncustodial father; consent by noncustodial father to adoption is
not required); cf Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (concurring) (enough males
are hurt by classification favoring veterans to refute class bias).
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although not traditionally a suspect classification, might be the object of
irrational and therefore impermissible legislative bias.133
Justice Stevens takes a similarly flexible approach, combining proce-
dural and substantive standards, in reviewing legislative rationality under
the due process clause. Although he is sensitive to claims that "funda-
mental" interests have been improperly infringed upon,134 he does not
warp his review of legislative behavior with a predetermined judgment
about the" 'proper' standard of review."135 Family relationships, for ex-
ample, are often regulated by the government 136 and a predisposition to
call them "fundamental" only clouds an analysis of the rationality of
specific government action. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Justice
Stevens refused to concur in the majority's substantive due process
analysis, 137 which posited a fundamental interest in family living
arrangements. 38 But that did not mean that the government had im-
posed "a permissible restriction on appellant's right to use her own prop-
erty as she sees fit." 139 Linking this property right to common law rights
predating the adoption of the Constitution, 40 Justice Stevens concluded
that the government "failed totally to explain the need for a rule which
would allow a homeowner to have two grandchildren live with her ifthey
are brothers, but not if they are cousins."' 41 The state had therefore de-
prived appellants of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
133. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978) (concurring in the judgment) (statute prohib-
iting marriage without court approval by individual with support obligation is an example of irra-
tional "legislative discrimination between the rich and poor"). In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2495 (1988) (dissenting), the Court dealt with a state law allowing unreor-
ganized but not reorganized school districts to charge school bus fees. The discrimination was
meant to encourage reorganization by allaying the voters' concern about school bus fees. Justice
Stevens argued that, once a school district voted against reorganization, permitting it to charge bus
fees was unconstitutionally irrational. In his view, there was no further reason to "place an obstacle
in the paths of poor children seeking an education," once the school district decided whether or not
to reorganize. Id.
134. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520 (1977) (concurring in the judg-
ment) (Ordinance which excludes an "owner's relatives from the group of persons who may occupy
his residence on a permanent basis," offends a fundamental right, "that of an owner to decide who
may reside on his or her property .... ).
135. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 112-15 (1987) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reviewing state action limiting prisoners right to marry and communicate by mail). The majority
had adopted conventional "fundamental interest" analysis to protect the right to marry. Id. at 94-
97.
136. Zablocki 434 U.S. at 403-04.
137. 431 U.S. 494, 520 (1977) (concurring in the judgment).
138. Id. at 499.
139. Id. at 513.
140. Id.
141 Id. at 520
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Justice Stevens' concern with th6 legislature's "fail[ure] totally to
explain the need for a rule" 142 rests on a higher standard of legislative
rationality than the traditional due process standard. According to Jus-
tice Stevens, an accidental malfunction of the legislative process violates
due process, whether or not the interest involved is traditionally consid-
ered "fundamental." For example, in a case involving access to govern-
ment benefits for Indians, Justice Stevens found there had been a
deprivation of property without due process of law because there was "a
legislative accident, perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortu-
nate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it
should." 143 But where the legislature appears to struggle with "intracta-
ble economic, social, and even philosophical problems" of welfare, 144
Justice Stevens finds the result "rational." 145
To determine whether or not the legislative process is sufficiently
thoughtful to satisfy due process standards, Justice Stevens is willing to
hypothesize a legislative purpose, but not with the same degree of judicial
deference traditionally associated with minimum rationality analysis. In
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 146 for example, he
commented negatively on the Court's acceptance of whatever purpose
the government might concoct to justify the statute as rational. Justice
Stevens believed that something more than a "conceivable" or "plausi-
ble" explanation was needed to support a claim that legislation distin-
142. Id; see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 189
(1979) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Statute dealing with ballot access] is
either a product of a malfunction of the legislative process or merely a by-product of this Court's
decision in [another case]"; statute is "impartial" and therefore does not violate Equal Protection,
because it does not classify voters on a basis such as religion, but it does cause a deprivation of liberty
without "due process of lawmaking," because it is not based on a "rational predicate.").
143. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (dissenting). Justice
Stevens admitted that the legislature followed its own procedures, but still found the legislative "ac-
cident" objectionable. Although it was "improbable," he was "not prepared to say that if Congress
had actually reviewed the status of the Kansas Delawares, it might not have found some principled
basis for treating them differently from other Delawares." Id.; see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 720 (1987) (concurring in the judgment) (the "abruptness and lack of explanation" for includ-
ing an escheat provision in a bill depriving Indians of property deprived them of due process).
144. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 609 (1987) (majority) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S., 471, 487 (1970) (Stewart, J.)).
145. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591 (1982) (majority) (medically needy can be ineligible
for medical benefits even though they are worse off after medical expenses than some eligible cash
welfare recipients; eligibility for a needs-based program based on gross income levels was rational;
Congress was "aware" of the effects of the Medicaid rule); Gilard, 483 U.S. at 609 (child support
attributed to entire family to measure need was rational).
Legislative deliberation also may prevent the court from going behind the plain meaning of a
statute. See Alexander v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634, 637, 640 (1977) (majority) ("It is difficult to believe
tfiat language this clear could be the product of a drafting error." The "statutory exclusion is un-
questionably the product of a deliberate and rational choice .....
146. 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (concurring in the judgment).
1117
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
guishing among workers eligible for dual Social Security and Railroad
Retirement benefits was rational. Because "[a]ctual purpose is some-
times unknown," however, the Court could hypothesize a legitimate pur-
pose that it could "reasonably presume .. .motivated an impartial
legislature." 147 The requirement that the hypothesized legislative pur-
pose be "legitimate," "reasonable," and "impartial" obviously depends
on a more exacting substantive judicial standard than would be imposed
by a court willing to accept virtually any legislative purpose proposed by
a litigant. Justice Stevens' due process analysis, like his approach to
equal protection, is thus a blend of substantive reasonableness and proce-
dural thoughtfulness.
b. Agency rationality. Justice Stevens is more suspicious of agen-
cies than of legislatures: "[Tihe 'presumption of regularity afforded an
agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate' is not equivalent to 'the mini-
mum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under
the Due Process Clause.'"148 Judicial review of agency action is
therefore presumptively available. 149
The origin of Justice Stevens' concern about agency rationality is
undoubtedly a fear that politically insulated administrators, hidden from
public view, can wield great and unrestrained power over individuals
with the potential for abuse. Thus, it counts strongly against an agency if
that agency appears to use its power as a lever to achieve something
outside the scope of its authority. 150 This perspective is consistent with
147. Id. at 180-8 1. A judicial search for actual legislative purpose might give courts too much
power to impose their own policy preferences. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 US. 613, 643 (1982)
(dissenting).
It goes without saying that traditional bias cannot justify interference with liberty. See Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 219 (1986) (dissenting) ("habitual dislike" for homosexuals cannot sup-
port state action violating their liberty interests); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 715
(1977) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("irrational and perverse" to symboli-
cally object to contraceptives by prohibiting their advertising and thereby inflicting harm on those
who would buy them; deprivation of liberty without due process of law).
148. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 626-27 (1986) (plurality); see also id. at 627
("need to vest administrative agencies with ample power... carries with it the correlative responsi-
bility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision").
149. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 461 (1988) (dissenting) (strong presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270,
287 (1987) (concurring in the judgment) (should review agency action); Bowen v. Michigan Acad-
emy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (majority) (strong presumption ofjudicial re-
view of agency action); cf Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 631-37 (1984) (concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (should review denial of Medicare); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 511 (1982) (dissenting) (at least one de novo trial required). But see
Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454 (1979) (majority) (court lacks
power to review agency decision not to investigate).
150. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 254
(1978) (dissenting) ("approval power is a sort of lever that [the agency] may use to bend the will of
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Justice Stevens' view that it is always improper to subject the individual
to arbitrary government action, whether or not the interests affected are
traditionally viewed as "fundamental."
The rationality standard applicable to agencies therefore is stricter
than that applicable to legislatures. Agencies must demonstrate more
affirmatively than a legislature that they have followed a rational deci-
sionmaking process, both in sticking to ends authorized by others and in
explaining how adopted rules serve those ends. Thus, an agency deprives
someone of liberty without due process by failing to link its action to a
goal within the grant of agency authority; 151 by failing to give adequate
consideration to relevant factors; 152 by not explaining the connection
between the facts found and choices made;153 and by failing to make the
findings necessary to justify its action. 154
An agency's failure to follow its own procedural rules also counts
against the Court's deference to an agency's position,1 55 except when it
would discourage the agency's formulation of internal procedural rules,
independent bank owners and managers"); United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 426 U.S. 500, 524
(1976) (dissenting) (fear that agency will "work its will in the form of conditional approvals"); ef
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408, 417 (1984) (dissenting) (legitimate to prohibit
public subsidies of partisan points of view because political "strings" attached to money threatens
the recipient's independence; "[tihe court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with
great care"); Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508-12 (1983) (majority) (FCC
should not be able to force protection for handicapped; outside of its area of competence); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality) ("In the
absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give
the Secretary the unprecedented power over American industry that would result from the Govern-
ment's view" of the statute.).
151. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-17 (1976) (majority); cf Gottfried, 459 U.S.
at 508-09 (FCC should not be able to force licensees to protect the hearing impaired).
152. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 56 (1981) (dissenting) (arguing that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services failed to give adequate consideration to relevant factors in determin-
ing when the income of one spouse may be "deemed" available to the other for the purpose of
establishing eligibility for Medicaid benefits).
153. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 470 U.S. 610, 626 (1986) (plurality) ("It is an axiom of
administrative law that an agency's explanation of the basis for its decision must include 'a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.' "); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571,
585-86 (1981) (majority) (government "has not 'suggested any rational basis for linking the right to a
depletion deduction to the period of time that the taxpayer operates a mine' ").
154. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 642-59 (OSHA failed to make sufficient find-
ings which would justify a standard reducing exposure to airborne benzene).
155. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 951 (1986) (dissenting) (Agriculture Department did not
follow its own rules); see also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 253 (1986) (concurring
in the judgment) (Congress intends agency to act in a "regular and fundamentally fair way" and
with "reasonable diligence"); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 416 (1983) (con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("orderly, certain, and consistent interpreta-
tion" in tax matters is important because tax involves capital investment); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (majority) ("strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by
the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law").
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which are the best protection against arbitrary action. 5 6 The impor-
tance of regularity in agency behavior is evident in Justice Stevens' view
that consistent agency interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
even more weight than agency interpretation of a statute. 5 7
Suspicion about an agency's deliberative process helps to explain
Justice Stevens' retraction of some of the broader implications of his
opinion in Chevron, 158 which had established a broad principle of defer-
ence to agency rules. In his later opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice
Stevens argued that where "[t]he question.., is a pure question of statu-
tory construction for the court to decide," judicial deference to the
agency is inappropriate. 159 In deciding this "pure question," he "em-
ploy[ed] traditional tools of statutory construction," and reached his own
conclusion about the statute's meaning; he was careful, though, to distin-
guish "pure interpretation" from cases in which the agency fills gaps left
by the legislature.' 6° This qualification of the Chevron decision was not
casually arrived at, but was maintained in the face of an explicit chal-
lenge by Justice Scalia to a more restrictive view of judicial deference to
administrative rules in Cardoza-Fonseca. '61 In retrospect, Justice Ste-
vens' statements in Chevron, emphasizing the "detailed and reasoned"
agency decisionmaking process and the "technical and complex" nature
of the regulatory scheme, 162 may better reflect his own more cautious
156. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 756 (1979) (majority):
In the long run, it is far better to have rules like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to
tolerate occasional erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record, than
either to have no rules except those mandated by statute, or to have them framed in a mere
precatory form.
See also Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 511 (1983) (majority) (rulemaking better
than license renewal procedure).
157. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982) (majority) ("The Commissioner's inter-
pretation of the Regulation has been consistent ... and is entitled to respect."); cf Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1850 (1989) (majority) (agency interpretation of
own regulation controlling because not "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent' ").
158. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (major-
ity). See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
159. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987) (major-
ity) (asylum application under § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act not governed by the
"clear probability" standard under § 243(h) of the Act).
160. Id. at 446.
161. Id. at 452-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
162. 467 U.S. at 865; see also Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 438 (1988) (dissent-
ing) (judicial deference to the agency is more justified when the issue is more technical).
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view of judicial deference to agency interpretation, 163 rather than the
super-deferential approach that many have attributed to Chevron. 164
2. Individual Dignity.
The requirement that legislatures and administrative agencies delib-
erate thoughtfully is one aspect of the broader substantive requirement
that individual dignity be respected. This section elaborates further on
the substantive content of Justice Stevens' commitment to individual dig-
nity and the relationship between judicial restraint and dignity values.
a. Substantive content. Justice Stevens-explains his conception of
individual dignity in a quotation from Ronald Dworkin:
Mill saw independence as a further dimension of equality; he argued
that an individual's independence is threatened, not simply by a polit-
163. Justice Stevens often holds that agency regulations exceed statutory authority. See, eg.,
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 984 (1986) (dissenting) (ambiguity in statutory
language should not be invented to justify deference to agency); Local 82, Furniture and Piano
Moving, Furniture Store Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 558 (1984) (dissenting) (the legislative
history of the statute removes the Secretary of Labor as a protector of union interests); Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 406 (1984) (dissenting) (plain
language precludes agency decision); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319,
342 (1983) (majority) (agency position inconsistent with "history, structure, and basic philosophy"
of statute); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 161 (1977) (majority)
(taxpayer position is firmly anchored in the text; Treasury regulation improper).
In some cases, however, he defers to agency decisions. Many of these decisions are majority
decisions, where the judge writing the opinion might be expected to include a variety of points of
view, some of which are not central to his own judicial philosophy. See, eg., Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1865 (1989) (majority) ("Even if another decision
maker might have reached a contrary result," decision by Army Corps of Engineers was not "'a
clear error of judgment.' "); Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 1676 (1989) (majority) ("It is
sufficient ... that the Secretary's determination ... constitutes a reasonable construction of the
statute."); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135,
137 (1987) (majority) ("The Agency's interpretation .... is deserving of substantial deference .. ");
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 537-38 (1985) (majority) (defer-
ring to Secretary of Health and Human Services on definition of "institution or mental diseases");
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981) (majority)
("The Board's determination ... is entitled to the greatest deference."); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S.
288, 296 (1977) (majority) ("We conclude that the federal regulations defining income were reason-
ably adopted by the Secretary in the performance of his statutory duty .... "); Bayside Enters. v.
NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 302 (1977) (majority) ("This conclusion by the Board is one we must respect
Justice Stevens also deferred to agency decisions in two dissents, but in both cases he affirmed
the agency's decision to infer a private remedy, which is a position Justice Stevens generally favors,
See infra note 338; Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 643 (1983) (dissenting)
("The presumption of validity must be at least as strong when a regulation does not seek to control
the conduct of independent private parties, but merely defines the terms on which someone may seek
federal money."); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 64 (1977) (dissenting) (private remedy is
necessary to follow Congress's intent); see also Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 438
(1988) (dissenting) (the more technical the issue, the more judicial deference to the agency).
164. See Farina, supra note 67, at 457.
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ical process that denies him equal voice, but by political decisions that
deny him equal respect. Laws... that constrain one man, on the sole
ground that he is incompetent to decide what is right for himself, are
profoundly insulting to him. They... deny him the independence to
which he is entitled. Mill insisted on the political importance of these
moral concepts of dignity, personality, and insult. It was these com-
plex ideas, not the simpler idea of license, that he tried to make avail-
able for political theory. 165
This statement reaffirms that the procedural right to participate is part of
a broader substantive claim to equal respect-a claim that is not sharply
distinguished from a claim to independence. Deprivation of equal re-
spect is a deprivation of liberty.166
Equal respect, of course, requires impartial treatment. Impartiality
and prohibition of bias,167 according to the prior discussion, is therefore
integral to Justice Stevens' concern for individual dignity. A distinctive
feature of his view of equal respect is a special concern about unequal
treatment of the rich and the poor. This concern led Justice Stevens to
conclude that equal protection principles prohibit a state legislature from
preventing marriage by a poor person who did not support his chil-
dren; 168 a state law allowing unreorganized-but not reorganized-
school districts to charge school bus fees was unconstitutional because,
once a school district voted against reorganization, there was no further
reason "to place an obstacle in the paths of poor children seeking an
education"; 169 and a statute should be interpreted to avoid the "cruel
irony" that a law meant to help the needy elderly would "protect from
administrative absolutism only those wealthy enough to be able to afford
an operation and then seek reimbursement."' 170 Favoritism for the rich
can be equally offensive. Thus, enforcement of an eleven billion dollar
lien by Texas did not violate due process, since "deal[ing] equally with
165. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 485 (1983) (dissenting) (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOusLY 263 (1977)).
166. Stevens, supra note 73, at 284.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29.
168. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978) (concurring in the judgment).
169. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2495 (1988) (dissenting).
170. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 630 (1984) (concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part); see also Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1824 (1989) (dissenting)
(lawyer's duty to assist the poor is an ancient tradition); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1616 (1989) (dissenting) (only wealthy custodial parents can afford to
establish off-reservation domicile); Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 866 (1986)
(dissenting) ("class of persons that Congress intended to benefit by creating the 'Earned Income
Credit' Program in 1975 is composed entirely of low-income families"); cf McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 377 (1987) (dissenting) (expressing "lingering questions about why a Court that
has not been particularly receptive to the rights of criminal defendants in recent years has acted so
dramatically to protect the elite class of powerful individuals who will benefit from this decision").
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the rich and the poor does not admit of a special exemption for multibil-
lion-dollar corporations or transactions." 171
Dworkin's quotation from Mill172 also links the idea of equal re-
spect, as it is usually implemented through the equal protection clause,
with the right to independence, usually analyzed as a due process liberty
right. Justice Stevens chides his colleagues for not appreciating the value
of liberty, as noted above.173 Liberty is a right not traceable to specific
legal texts or government decisions: "[N]either the Bill of Rights nor the
laws of the sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process
Clause protects."1 74 He also rejects the monetarization of liberty values:
"The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing pecuniary
costs against the societal benefits .... For the value of protecting our
liberty from deprivation by the State without due process of law is
priceless." 1 75
Justice Stevens' conception of liberty is both expansive and evolv-
ing.' 76 It includes a right to privacy in choice of life style, which includes
the choice to engage in homosexual relationships. 177 Privacy values also
should be protected by adapting the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches to new situations, such as searches of stu-
dents 78 and motor homes.'7 9 And Justice Stevens' conception of the
fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination is explicitly linked to
individual dignity. He therefore would distinguish (as the Court's major-
ity would not) between an impermissible government demand for the
combination to a safe and a permissible demand for a key, on the theory
that compelling the defendant to use his mind to provide a combination
171. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 34 (1987) (concurring in the judgment).
172. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 3.
174. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (dissenting); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 580-81 (1979) (dissenting).
175. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (dissenting); see also Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 466 (1986) (dissenting) (rejecting cost-benefit analysis in case concerning
right of criminal accused to legal assistance); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701 (1977) (dissent-
ing) (monetary damages less likely to compensate for loss of liberty than property).
176. Stevens, supra note 18, at 727-28; cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691 (1988)
(plurality) (evolving standards of decency define what is cruel dnd unusual punishment in the con-
text of the death penalty).
177. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (dissenting); see also Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2347 (1989) (concurring in the judgment) (natural father has constitutionally
protected right in relationship with child, even though mother married to and cohabited with an-
other at time of conception and birth); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1597 (1989)
(concurring in the judgment) (opportunity to make friends and enjoy the company of others is an
aspect of liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment, rather than first amendment right of
association).
178. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 407 (1985) (dissenting).
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that might incriminate him "invade[s] the dignity of the human
mind." 80
Justice Stevens also finds liberty interests in situations in which
others might assume that they had been completely lost, as in the case of
prisoners, whom he views as a classic case of a vulnerable, discrete, and
insular minority:
By telling prisoners that no aspect of their individuality, from a photo
of a child to a letter from a wife, is entitled to constitutional protection,
the Court breaks with the ethical tradition that I had thought was en-
shrined forever in our jurisprudence.18 1
Justice Stevens also has dissented in favor of prisoners in cases involving
transfers between prisons,18 2 administrative segregation,8 3 first amend-
ment rights, 184 and rights to communicate and marry, 85 thereby fulfil-
ling the expectations of those inmates who had written in support of his
nomination. 18 6
Justice Stevens is especially alert to government deprivation of indi-
vidual liberty through the manipulation of criteria designed to protect
liberty interests. As a result, fifth amendment protections apply to invol-
untary commitments of "sexually dangerous persons" because they are
"virtually identical to [proceedings] for prosecution of sex-related
crimes"; 8 7 they also apply to a civil penalty that is really a "criminal
sanction."'818 Similarly, attempts to avoid the Miranda warnings
180. Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2352 n.1 (1988) (dissenting). The difference between
"forced execution of this document differs from the forced production of physical evidence just as
human beings differ from other animals." Id. at 2352.
181. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 558 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (dissenting).
183. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 479 (1983) (dissenting).
184. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1885 (1989) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
185. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Hearings, supra note 9, at 15. A concern for prisoners is also apparent in Justice Stevens'
approach to the retroactivity of new judicial decisions in habeas corpus cases. He agrees with the
majority that new law should not be retroactively applied except when it excludes behavior from the
reach of the criminal law or involves fundamental fairness. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1080
(1989) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But he defines the permissible reach of
the criminal law more narrowly than the majority, Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2983 (1989)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the concept of fundamental fairness for purposes of
permitting retroactive application of new judicial law more broadly than the plurality, Teague, 109
S. Ct. at 1080-81 (fundamental fairness not limited to accuracy-impairing procedures). He also re-
jects the majority's view that the issue of retroactivity should be decided before a new rule is an-
nounced. Id. at 1079-80 n.2. The Court undoubtedly would play a greater role in protecting
prisoners if the decision to adopt a new rule preceded a judgment on retroactivity.
187. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (dissenting).
188. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 257 (1980) (dissenting) (arguing that a monetary
penalty imposed pursuant to Federal Water Pollution Control Act was a criminal sanction).
Vol. 1989:1087] COMMON LAW LAWYER
through a narrow definition of "interrogation" will not be tolerated.18 9
Fourth amendment search warrant requirements must not be circum-
vented by application of the "independent source" doctrine to allow the
use of evidence rediscovered during a legal search following prior illegal
discovery. 190 Rules governing a criminal trial must not be restructured
to weaken constitutional protections: the government's burden of proof
must not be diluted by redefining the elements of the crime, 191 and safe-
guards in sentencing procedures must be observed to prevent prejudice in
the determination of guilt.192
Justice Stevens differs, however, from some of his "liberal" col-
leagues, such as Justices Brennan and Marshall, in the extent to which he
would have the Court second-guess administrative determinations affect-
ing liberty interests. The central problem for Justice Stevens is to prevent
thoughtless government decisions-to deter policemen, not to punish
them. 193 Justice Stevens is thus content to rely on wen-designed proce-
dures, absent evidence of official bad faith, 194 for adequate protection.
Consider the following search warrant decisions: When a search warrant
was properly obtained for one apartment, although it mistakenly covered
a second apartment, the search of the second apartment did not violate
the fourth amendment since "the officers' conduct and the limits of the
search were based on the information available as the search pro-
ceeded"; 195 when a "neutral and detached magistrate" had issued a
search warrant, it was permissible to detain the residents and to search
189. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 309 (1980) (dissenting) ("absolute right to have any
type of interrogation cease until an attorney was present"); see also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520,
531 (1987) (dissenting) ("powerful psychological ploy" by police); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
365 (1985) (dissenting) (fifth amendment is "one of the core constitutional rights" protecting citizens
from "tyranny"); cf Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2403-04 (1988) (dissenting) (waiver of
Miranda rights does not mean the prosecution can violate the sixth amendment right to counsel by
interviewing an indicted accused).
190. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2540 (1988) (dissenting).
191. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (dissenting) (demeans reasonable doubt
standard if it could be avoided by making prohibited conduct not an element of the crime).
192. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 456-57 (1983) (dissenting) (unfairly merge sentence
and guilt determination); see also Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 229 (1981) (dissenting) (inter-
pret statute so as not to permit increase of sentence); cf Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 387
(1983) (dissenting) (when accused pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, the government must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that incarceration beyond maximum prison sentence is justi-
fied); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 468 (1981) (dissenting) (commutation
of sentence proceedings).
193. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1979) (concurring).
194. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979) (majority) (Court should not apply
exclusionary rule when procedures allow Executive to sanction agency for violating electronic sur-
veillance regulations); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (majority) ("detailed and reasoned" agency decision).
195. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (majority) (there must be "some latitude for
honest mistakes").
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them as incidental to the search of the premises; 196 and meaningless,
watered-down requirements for regulatory search warrants are a costly
formality that should not be required. 197
Justice Stevens' emphasis on liberty does not require that property
interests be neglected. Liberty requires treatment with equal respect,
which demands that individual rights in general must be protected from
arbitrary harm. Consequently, Justice Stevens believes that the common
law right to control one's own property can be interfered with only if the
legislature has an adequate justification. 98 A delay in the hearing after
seizure of property violates due process. 199 And a statute was interpreted
to prevent agency action from depriving appellees of their livelihood by
legislative accident. 200 In the same vein, stare decisis is also important to
Justice Stevens because consistency supports "settled expectations" and
public confidence in the stability of the "rules of law." 20
Justice Stevens also has concerns about private as well as govern-
ment concentrations of power. He views antitrust laws as the "Magna
Carta of free enterprise. ' 20 2 The exemption from federal antitrust laws
for state action therefore should be narrowly construed. 20 3 By contrast,
he defines "state action" expansively to require a pre-seizure hearing
when private creditors seize property from debtors. 204 The common
theme in these two state action cases is to prevent private deprivation of
196. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981) (majority).
197. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (dissenting) ("[W]e should not dilute
the requirements of the Warrant Clause in an effort to force every kind of governmental intrusion...
into a judicially developed, warrant-preference scheme.").
198. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513, 520 (1977) (concurring in the judgment).
199. United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 570 (1983) (dissenting) ("[A] rule that allows the
Government to dispossess a citizen of her property for more than 18 months ... without a hearing is
a flagrant violation of the Fifth Amendment.")
200. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 117-18 (1985) (dissenting) ("[T]he choice of the lan-
guage... is.. . at best 'the consequence of a legislative accident .... ' In my view, Congress actually
intended to authorize an annual filing at atiy time prior to the close of business on December 31st
201. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
202. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 666 (1977) (dissenting) (allowing federal
injunction against state courts). Justice Stevens had been an antitrust specialist before becoming a
judge. Hearings, supra note 9, at 4-5; see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96, 126-27 (1978) (dissenting) (violates due process clause to allow private party to get injunction to
stop private competition without review by the government).
203. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 80 (1985)
(dissenting) (activity is not exempt state action); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 600 (1984) (dis-
senting) (exempting lawyers would create a "gaping hole in the fabric of antitrust law"); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597-98 (1976) (majority) (activity is not exempt state action). But
cf Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (majority) (federal
regulatory scheme creates exception to antitrust laws; prior decision interpreting statute followed).
204. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1978) (dissenting). But cf NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462-65 (1988) (majority) (state university adoption of NCAA rules does
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property, without concern for adopting a consistent definition of state
action.
Lawyers have a special role to play in protecting the individual from
arbitrary government action and in giving the individual confidence that
such protection has been provided.20 5 Justice Stevens objects when the
Court disallows a criminal defendant's waiver of his lawyer's conflict of
interest, and he chides the majority for its "apparent unawareness of the
function of the independent lawyer as guardian of our freedom. ' 20 6 He
also would extend the right of free counsel to cases involving a termina-
tion of parental rights.20 7 And two of the cases-one was a criminal pro-
ceeding 2 8 and the other civil2°9 -in which Justice Stevens castigates his
not constitute state action); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115-18 (1984) (majority) (pri-
vate search does not implicate fourth amendment concerns).
205. Stevens, supra note 73, at 285-86; Hearings, supra note 9, at 78 ("could not overemphasize
the importance of the lawyer's role in the adversary process and it is unquestionably a matter of
major importance in all litigation"). But see Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 602 (1989) (majority)
(trial judge has discretion to forbid lawyer from consulting with client-defendant during 15-minute
recess between client's direct testimony and cross-examination); McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 108 S.
Ct. 1895, 1903-04 (1988) (majority) (loyalty to the client does not forbid state from requiring ap-
pointed lawyer for an accused to explain why an appeal would be frivolous).
206. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1704 (1988) (dissenting) (quoting his dissent in
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 (1985)); see also Murray v.
Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2773 (1989) (dissenting) (indigent prisoners have right to appointed
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in death cases); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 109
S. Ct. 1814, 1824 (1989) (dissenting) (interprets statute allowing court to "request" lawyer to help
the poor as requiring lawyer to accept assignment); Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 350 (1988)
(majority) (state errs in procedure used to allow withdrawal from first appeal by defense counsel for
indigent criminal defendant on grounds that appeal was meritless); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 452-
53 (1979) (dissenting) (pro hac vice petition implicates lawyer's responsibility for administering
justice).
207. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (dissenting).
208. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 467 (1986) (dissenting) (police interfered with attorney-
client relationship, which is of "central importance to the administration of justice," by telling law-
yer falsely that there was no intent to question the accused); cf Gilmore v. Armontrout, 109 S. Ct.
3205, 3206 (1989) (dissenting) (objects to shortening time for counsel to prepare in capital case);
Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2403-04 (1988) (dissenting) (prosecutor communication with
indicted defendant violates sixth amendment right to counsel, even though Miranda rights waived);
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (majority) (public defender job cannot be contingent on
party membership because lawyer must serve individual clients, not partisan political interest);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (concurring) ("the lawyer is the essential medium
through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen";
the State cannot dishonor its promises to lawyer for the accused); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
362 (1977) (plurality) (violates due process of law not to tell defendant or counsel of contents of
presentence report).
209. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985) (dissenting)
(statute limiting the fee that can be paid a lawyer representing a veteran before the Veterans Admin-
istration is an infringement on individual liberty); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472
U.S. 424, 443-44 (1985) (concurring) (disqualification of lawyer is appealable before final judgment
in civil litigation because it is the only effective way to protect right to choose lawyer).
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colleagues for not appreciating the value of liberty involved the right to
counsel.
Justice Stevens' grounding of liberty and equality in a conception of
individual dignity has two important implications that help to explain
why he sometimes differs from his more "liberal" colleagues. First, the
individual is not free simply to do what she wants: There are also correl-
ative responsibilities. For example, the fifth amendment may protect the
accused's right to silence, but it does not forbid the state from impeach-
ing the defendant by referring to his silence210 or limiting the public jobs
available to someone who claims the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.21 1 Even a death sentence, which demands the ultimate in responsi-
bility from a citizen, may be imposed as an act of retribution if a jury
expresses community outrage.2 12
Perhaps the most striking example of liberty qualified by a correla-
tive responsibility is Justice Stevens' refusal to include flag burning
within protected first amendment speech.213 "If [the] ideas of [liberty
and equality] are worth fighting for [, then] ... it cannot be true that the
flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protec-
tion from unnecessary desecration. '214
The second implication is that the government threatens dignity not
only by direct deprivations and insults, but also by paternalistic behavior.
In procedural due process cases, as a result, Justice Stevens objects to the
"paternalistic predicate," which requires more notice than an intelligent
person should require.215 He worries about a decision that would create
a "permanent constitutional shield" for Blacks since it "underestimates
the resourcefulness, the wisdom, and the demonstrated capacity of [their]
210. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (dissenting). In Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S.
284 (1986) (majority), however, he wrote for the Court in a case following Doyle.
211. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 810-12 (1977) (dissenting); see also Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (public interest in determining cause of serious railroad accidents justifies regulations
on drug and alcohol testing); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660,
672 (1988) (majority) (a state can condition unemployment insurance on the employee not being
dismissed for illegal use of peyote drug); cf. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 282-83 (1983)
(dissenting) (answers can be compelled because they are derived from immunized testimony).
212. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469-70, 480 (1984) (dissenting); see also supra notes 103-
07 and acompanying text.
213. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2555-57 (1989) (dissenting).
214. Id. at 2557.
215. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 22, 26 (1978) (dissenting) ("trivial-
izes" due process of law to require notice in this case); cf Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306,
1315 (1988) (majority) (requirements of notice to AFDC families not violated; "it is not irrational to
assume that most needy families will realize that the receipt of a large lump sum may affect their
future eligibility").
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leaders. '216 And he rejects the majority's paternalism in denying a crim-
inal accused the right to waive conflicts of interest in choosing his
lawyer.217
b. Judicial restraint and individual dignity. Justice Stevens'
open-ended and evolving conception of individual dignity cannot be
characterized as restrained. This conception of individual dignity thus
may appear to conflict with his commitment to judicial restraint. The
appearance, however, is misleading. Justice Stevens adheres to judicial
restraint since it is instrumental in protecting individual dignity values,
but he also qualifies judicial restraint to implement those values.
216. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 653 (1982) (dissenting); see also City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 733-34 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552-54 (1980) (dissenting) (stigmatizing effect of race-conscious
legislation); cf Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (majority) (political propaganda label
required by the government is allowed because we can trust individuals to distinguish truth and
falsity).
217. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1704 (1988) (dissenting). Anti-paternalism also
may explain why Justice Stevens is not only deeply concerned about protecting the right to counsel,
see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text, but also willing to rely on the lawyer to handle the
case, even to the point of "wounding" the client, Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646, 656-57 (1988)
(majority) (can exclude pro-defendant testimony when accused's lawyer improperly failed to identify
a witness in response to a request by the prosecutor; not unfair to hold defendant responsible for
lawyer misconduct). It is up to the client to keep control of the lawyer. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450
U.S. 288, 307 (1981) (concurring) (lawyer and defendant decide if they want jury instruction);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 111 (1976) (majority) (prosecutor does not routinely have
to give information which the lawyer has not requested). Rejecting judicial paternalism, however,
accepts the risk of counsel's paternalism to the client. See Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense
Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 34-35 (1986).
Another explanation for relying on the lawyer, even when she makes mistakes, is that counsel is
another institution, like the states and lower courts, whose decisions must be relied on, without too
much second-guessing by reviewing courts. See supra section II.A. 1. Justice Stevens often speaks of
lawyers as though they were an independent institution. In his view, the lawyer is the essential
medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the
citizen. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (concurring) (defendant's right to counsel
violated by officer's interrogation contrary to agreement with defendant's attorney); see also Taylor,
108 S. Ct. at 657 (failure to hold client responsible for lawyer's misconduct would undercut the heart
of the attorney-client relationship); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71 (1985)
(concurring) (lawyer's participation encourages incremental development of the law); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1216 (1984) (dissenting) (should rely on lawyer to frame issues in certiorari
petition); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1979) (dissenting) (responsibility of lawyer for ad-
ministering justice); cf McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 1900-01 (1988) (majority)
(loyalty to the client does not forbid state from requiring appointed lawyer for an accused to explain
why an appeal would be frivolous); Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1704 (1988) (dissenting)
(conflict of interest waived on advice of counsel).
Reliance on lawyers may explain why Justice Stevens views ineffective assistance of counsel as
the "exceptional case." Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 657; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 798 (1987)
(majority) (lawyer whose partner represents coindictee not per se ineffective counsel).
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The central idea that reconciles judicial restraint with a commit-
ment to individual dignity is that of comparative judicial competence z ",
in which the federal courts' primary task is to secure individual rights:
But we must not forget that a central purpose of our written Constitu-
tion, and more specifically of its unique creation of a life-tenured fed-
eral judiciary, was to ensure that certain rights are firmly secured
against possible oppression by Federal or State Governments ...
[T]he Court must be ever mindful of its primary role as the protector
of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor.219
Thus, Justice Stevens objects to creating the "unfortunate impression
that the Court is more interested in upholding the power of the State
than in vindicating individual rights. '220
Justice Stevens explicitly connects judicial restraint and individual
rights in cases involving the Court's deference to state courts by applying
the independent state ground doctrine, denying certiorari, and avoiding
summary dispositions. For example, in Michigan v. Long, he objected to
the Court's refusal to apply the independent state ground doctrine by
comparing review of a state court decision protecting a liberty interest to
the Court's concern with a decision by the Finnish government to turn
an American citizen loose since the Finnish Constitution parallels the
U.S. Constitution.221 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., he supported his argu-
ment that certiorari had been improvidently granted by observing that
"[o]f late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activ-
ism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least when it comes to
restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen. ' 222 And in Florida v.
Meyers, he noted (with dismay) nineteen cases of summary disposition,
"including this one" in which the Court summarily reversed state court
218. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNC-
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
219. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 385, 387 (1984) (dissenting).
220. Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 105 (1977) (dissenting in part); see also
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (dissenting) ("I believe that in reviewing the decisions
of state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate
federal rights have been fairly heard.").
221. 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (dissenting); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 681
(1982) (concurring in the judgment) ("This exercise in lawmaking is objectionable because it is
wholly unnecessary and because it compromises an important protection provided by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.").
222. 468 U.S. 1214, 1215 (1984) (dissenting); see also Idaho Dep't of Employment, 434 U.S. at
104 (should deny certiorari when state court provides fourteenth amendment protection for benefit
claim; "[w]e are much too busy to correct every error"); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 109 S. Ct. 205, 208
(1988) (dissenting) (bad use of scarce resources to grant certiorari when state's highest court refuses
to hear a case involving alleged error in defendant's favor).
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decisions that had provided greater protection of individual rights than
the Court allowed. 223
In Delaware v. Van Arsdell, 224 Justice Stevens observed not merely a
fortuitous connection between deferring to lower state courts and protec-
tion of individual rights, but also a systematic reduction in such protec-
tion when the Supreme Court failed to construe the independent state
ground doctrine broadly:
The jurisdictional presumption that the Court applies-and extends-
today harbors a hidden selection bias that in turn reveals a disturbing
conception of this Court's role. Because a state ground can only sup-
port a judgment consistent with a federal claim, the Court's jurisdic-
tional presumption [against an independent state ground] operates to
expand this Court's review of state remedies that over-compensate for
violations of federal constitutional rights.225
Judicial restraint also indirectly advances individual rights by limit-
ing the Court's workload so it can concentrate on cases in which individ-
ual dignity values are threatened. This indirect effect is achieved in three
ways. First, there is more time for judicial attention to cases involving
individual rights.226 Second, an unhurried judiciary better implements
the case-by-case deliberative process, which itself serves an important
dignity value.227 Excessive workload threatens this process by increasing
223. 466 U.S. 380, 386 (1984) (dissenting). In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1053 n.8 (1984)
(dissenting), the Court reached twenty. Cf Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (concur-
ring) (federal court should not expedite death sentence, which serves state policy; the federal interest
is protecting the constitutional rights of persons sentenced to death).
224. 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (dissenting).
225. Id. at 694-95; cf Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736-37 (1986) (majority) (allowing waiver
of attorneys fees in settlement of civil rights litigation reduces judicial workload, which in turn helps
civil rights litigants).
226. Cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2195-96 (1989) (dissenting) (broad allowance of col-
lateral review leads to abundance of vexatious litigation); Wrenn v. Benson, 109 S. Ct. 1629, 1631-32
(1989) (dissenting) (judicial time is conserved if Court routinely denies frivolous petitions rather
than first deciding whether petitioner can proceed in forma pauperis); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (dissenting) ("One thing is
certain. The Court's decision today will generate a great deal of litigation."); South Carolina v.
Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 419 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dismiss complaint in
original jurisdiction because claim by State was frivolous; unwise use of scarce resources); Bergman
v. Burton, 456 U.S. 952, 955 (1982) (dissenting) (the workload burden "disserves the interest of busy
federal judges as well as the interest of deserving litigants"); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24, 26 (1978) (dissenting) (remand "imposes an additional burden on circuit judges who-more than
any other segment of the federal judiciary-are struggling desperately to keep afloat in the flood of
federal litigation"); Liles v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963, 964 (1976) (concurring) ("In the interest of con-
serving scarce law library space, I shall not repeat this explanation [for denying certiorari to the state
court] every time I cast such a vote.").
227. See supra notes 70-101 and accompanying text.
1131Vol. 1989:1087]
1132 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:1087
delegation of work to the judge's staff, thereby detracting from judicial
deliberation.228
Third, every difficult case that the Court decides threatens to reduce
the political capital on which the Court relies for acceptance of its con-
clusions in individual rights cases. 229 The courts must be prepared to
make unpopular decisions, 230 according to Justice Stevens, but "when-
ever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage in the business
of giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our inde-
pendence and our strength. ' 231 Moreover,"intrusion upon the preroga-
tives of state courts.., can only provide a potential source of friction and
thereby threaten to undermine the respect on which we must depend for
faithful and conscientious application of this Court's expositions of the
federal law."'232
The primacy of individual dignity values also shines forth in the
cases qualifying the application of judicial restraint doctrines. Justice
Stevens' attitude towards general rules illustrates this point. Usually he
advocates proceeding deliberately on a case-by-case basis.233 In some
contexts, however, a general rule offers better protection from improper
government behavior. A clear rule concerning church-state separation,
228. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 337, 338-39 (1979) (concurring in the judgment) ("[The
burdens on federal judges] are already so heavy that they are delegating to staff assistants more and
more work that we once expected judges to perform"; "[t]he addition of a significant volume of
pointless labor can only impair the quality ofjustice ...."); see also Jones, Justice Stevens' Proposal
to Establish a Sub-Supreme Court, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 201, 205 (1983) ("Justice Stevens recently
proposed the creation of a new court designed to reduce the Supreme Court's caseload and to im-
prove the quality of its output"); Hearings, supra note 9, at 48-49 (more federal judges are needed to
meet the increased caseload).
229. See J. CHOPER, supra note 218, at 129-70 (discussion of problems associated with Court's
invalidation of actions by political bodies).
230. Stevens, Reflections on the Removal ofSitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REV. 215, 217 (1984).
231. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (concurring in
the judgment).
232. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (dissenting); see also Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 622 (1988) (dissenting) (reconsideration of an issue without re-
quest by the parties or Solicitor General "must also have a detrimental and enduring impact on the
public's perception of the Court as an impartial adjudicator of cases and controversies"); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984) (concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (deciding'
more than the Court must encourages the perception that the Court is pursuing its own "notions of
wise social policy, rather than adhering to its judicial role").
The appearance of justice is so important that a judge must retroactively disqualify himself,
even though he was unaware of the disqualifying conflict of interest when he decided the case.
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1988) (majority) (public confi-
dence in the integrity of the judicial process is so important that the judge's scienter is not necessary
for disqualification; it is sufficient that "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); cf Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality) (decision must "be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion"). See generally Hearings, supra note 9, at 31-32 (strict recusal
policy).
233. See supra section II.A.2.
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for example, is desirable to prevent government entanglement. 234 Ad-
ministrative discretion also may be controlled most effectively by a clear
rule.235 This is true not only in the administration of the criminal law,
236
but also in civil litigation such as tax cases. For example, Justice Stevens
argued that "[tihe value of certain and predictable rules of law is often
underestimated. Particularly in the field of taxation, there is a strong
interest in enabling taxpayers to predict the legal consequences of their
proposed actions ... . 237 And general rules sometimes may be useful to
contain judicial discretion in constitutional cases involving voting
rights. 238
Justice Stevens explicitly chooses between clear rules and vague
standards on the basis of their impact on substantive first amendment
concerns. Sometimes he adheres to the more conventional view that
vague rules are undesirable because they promote self-censorship. 239 But
a vague standard is preferred to a clear rule when the vague rule "obvi-
ously interferes less with the interest in free expression than does an ab-
234. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (dis-
senting) ("Rather than continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier' described in [another case], I would resurrect the 'high and impreg-
nable' wall between church and state constructed by the Framers of the First Amendment.")
Similar concern for containing government choice about religion prompted Justice Stevens' con-
currence in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 (1986) (concurring) (permitting prohibition
of yarmulke by military keeps government from distinguishing among Jews, Sikhs and Rastafarians);
see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "[w]hat should be a 'high and impregnable' wall between church and state, has been
reduced to a 'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' ").
235. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
236. See, eg., Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2098 (1988) (majority) (extolling virtues of
a "bright-line" rule like Miranda so that police and prosecutors know what to do); Greer v. Miller,
483 U.S. 756, 767 (1987) (concurring in the judgment) (if the prosecutor cannot call attention to
post-Miranda silence, it is better to have a "clearly defined rule").
237. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 101 (1987) (dissenting); cf United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 756 (1979) (majority) (stating that complete, yet occasionally erroneous rules "like
those contained in the IRS Manual" are better than no rules or rules "framed in a mere precatory
form").
238. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 643 (1982) (dissenting) ("constitutional adjudication
that is premised on a case-by-case appraisal of the subjective intent of local decisionmakers cannot
possibly satisfy the requirement of impartial administration of the law"); cf United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 962 (1984) (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Judges, more
than most, should understand the value of adherence to settled procedures" in deciding what the
courts should decide.)
Clear judicial rules also may encourage legislative responsibility by clarifying the law. See Fink,
483 U.S. at 104 (stating that if Congress understands that judicial interpretation will be consistent,
Congress will more closely scrutinize work product); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982) (majority) ("By articulating the rules of law with some clarity .... we
enhance the legislative prerogative to amend the law.").
239. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[The present constitutional standards [for obscenity] are so intolerably vague that evenhanded
enforcement of the law is a virtual impossibility.").
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stract, advance ruling that the film is simply unprotected whenever it
contains a lewd scene, no matter how brief."24
Justice Stevens' inclination to defer to the states24' also will be quali-
fied when individual rights are at stake. Application of the Younger ab-
stention doctrine, for example, is inappropriate when the state violates
procedural due process.242 And although deference to the states by nar-
row interpretation of the full faith and credit clause is appropriate,2 43 the
concerns implicated by the due process clause should be clearly distin-
guished from full faith and credit 244 and applied to disallow "a choice-of-
law decision [which is] totally arbitrary or... fundamentally unfair to
either litigant. ' 245 Similarly, nonjusticiability doctrines246 are applied
with an awareness of their impact on individual rights. For example,
Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's denial of standing in cases
involving the establishment clause and race discrimination.247 He also
240. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 780 (1982) (concurring in the judgment); see also
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1483-85
(1989) (majority) (bright line rule adopted to protect privacy interest).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
242. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 340-41 (1977) (concurring in judgment) (federal court absten-
tion inappropriate in case involving New York procedures designed to discover assets of delinquent
judgment debtors); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 436 (1979) (dissenting) (federal court abstention
inappropriate in case involving state's child-abuse legislation); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
469-70 (1977) (dissenting) (abstention inappropriate in case involving Illinois Attachment Act). See
also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (concurring in the judgment) (Delaware violates
due process clause by obtaining jurisdiction in a certain manner).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
244. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-22 (1981) (concurring in the judgment) (dis-
tinguishing Full Faith and Credit Clause requirement to apply Wisconsin law and due process pre-
vention of Minnesota law application). See generally Shreve, Interest Analysis in Constitutional Law,
48 OHIo ST. L. REV. 51, 55 n.27 (1987) (criticizing the Court for treating full faith and credit and
due process clauses as if "they imposed the same constraints on the forum court").
245. Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 326.
Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not require uniformity among states, see supra
text accompanying notes 61-62, but discrimination against interstate commerce is forbidden; Tyler
Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S, 232, 247 (1987) (majority) (state tax
exemption discriminates against interstate commerce); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58
(1982) (majority) (a Nebraska statute which permitted use of Nebraska water in Colorado only if
Colorado permitted use of Colorado water in Nebraska was a violation of the Interstate Commerce
Clause because Nebraska could not justify the discrimination); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 674-78 (1981) (dissenting) (equal protection clause violated by
California tax retaliating against Ohio corporations; the tax was in effect a hostage-taking to force
Ohio to change its discriminatory policies towards California).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
247. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 513 (1982) (dissenting) (religion); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 783 (1984)
(dissenting) (race); cf Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079-85 (1989) (con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (plaintiffs have standing to challenge state definition of "con-
ception" as violation of establishment clause).
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dissented from the Court's finding of mootness in several cases involving
liberty interests. 248
Judicial restraint, for Justice Stevens, is therefore instrumental in
protecting individual dignity. Such restraint is not justified on the basis
of overarching federalism or the separation of powers theory, but instead
reflects the judiciary's central role in preserving and advancing individual
rights.
C. Summary
Justice Stevens' core concern is individual dignity, which embraces
both equal treatment and liberty. Both these concepts deal with relation-
ships-with how people are treated-which explains why impartiality
and case-by-case deliberation are such important values and why pater-
nalism should be avoided. Formal categories that deflect the Court from
thinking carefully about the facts of the particular case should be
avoided. Justice Stevens therefore believes that people whose interests
are not traditionally labeled "fundamental" may deserve protection if the
government treats them thoughtlessly, and "fundamental interests" can
be restricted if the government acts reasonably.
Judicial restraint implements principles of comparative judicial
competence. The Court's primary concern is the protection of individual
dignity. Deference to the decisionmaker directly implements dignity val-
ues by allowing decisions that protect those values to stand. It also indi-
rectly serves those values by saving the Court's time and political capital
for the politically sensitive task of protecting individual dignity values.
Finally, Justice Stevens' commitment to individual dignity appeals
to the courts' grand tradition of protecting individual dignity.249 This
tradition rests on common law sources that predate the Constitution.250
Like all appeals to tradition, however, Justice Stevens' appeal faces sev-
248. Iron Arrow Honor Soe'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 73 (1983) (dissenting) (university's volun-
tary cessation of illegal act does not moot challenge to federal cut off of funds based on sex discrimi-
nation); Vitek v. Jones, 436 U.S. 407, 410-11 (1978) (dissenting) (parole practices); Scott v.
Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60, 60 (1976) (dissenting) (same); see also Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361, 365 (1987) (dissenting) (pocket veto challenge was not moot); EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 104
(1977) (dissenting) (case not moot unless agency rescinds regulation); cf. Bellotti v. Connally, 460
U.S. 1057, 1057 (1983) (dissenting) (finding substantial federal question involving first amendment
values concerning election procedures); Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 623 (1981) (dissenting) (claim
that prosecution of publication was based on hostility is a reviewable final judgment because it "seri-
ously erode[s] federal policy"); Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382, 392-96 (1981) (dissenting) (litigation
about parental rights is ripe).
249. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557-58 (1984) (concurring and dissenting) ("dignity and
intrinsic worth of every individual" are part of an "ethical tradition that I had thought was en-
shrined forever in our jurisprudence"); Stevens, Commentary, supra note 18, at 727.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 140 & 174.
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eral problems. Some traditions do not deserve deference (such as racial
bias);2 51 the content of some traditions change, as in the case of applying
privacy notions to sexual practices;252 and some traditions simply die
out.2 53 It is always difficult to know what traditions to follow. Still, tra-
ditions may carry a presumptive validity,2 54 perhaps for the same reason
that Justice Stevens defers to other decisionmakers. Judges cannot re-
make society easily and still have the time and political capital to do
what is most important.
III. STATUTES IN A COMMON LAW WORLD
How does the common law lawyer approach statutory interpreta-
tion, deferring to what the legislature has done but, at the same time,
paying close attention to the facts of the particular case and protecting
individual dignity? One approach would be to abandon the common-law
frame-of-mind, acknowledging that statutory interpretation is something
special. According to this view of statutes, the facts of a particular case
would be subordinated to the plain meaning of the statutory language.
In this view, individual dignity would have no special claim on the judge
who applies a statute, unless the legislature has delegated a common-law
power to the court or constitutional infirmities exist. The statute is what
it says, and that is the judge's only concern when interpreting its
meaning.
251. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 367 (1985) (dissenting)
(citations omitted):
The fact that [a statute] has been on the books since 1864 does not, in my opinion, add any
force at all to the presumption of validity. Surely the age of the dejure segregation at issue
in Brown v. Board of Education, or the age of the gerrymandered voting districts at issue in
Baker v. Carr, provided no legitimate support for those rules.
252. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214-16 (1986) (dissenting) ("traditional view that sod-
omy is an immoral kind of conduct, regardless of the persons who engage in it," is not constitution-
ally enforceable).
253. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 701 n.11 (1983) (dissenting) (American prac-
tice of litigants bearing their own legal costs is subject to certain exceptions, even when the litigant is
unsuccessful).
New facts also may render an old rule inconsistent with a tradition that persists. In Walters v.
National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 365, 367 (1985) (dissenting), a $10 limit
on counsel fees was reasonable at the time of the Civil War, when it was adopted, but "time has
brought changes in the value of the dollar, in the character of the legal profession, in agency proce-
dures, and in the ability of the veteran to proceed without the assistance of counsel." Therefore, "the
passage of time ... has effectively eroded the one legitimate justification that formerly made the
legislation rational." Id. at 367.
254. See, eg., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court., 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1824 (1989) (dissenting)
(historical tradition of legislative assistance to the poor); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92
(1980) (concurring in the judgment) (allowing electoral practices that might hurt minorities;
thousands of political units follow practice); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (plu-
rality) (permitting regulation of offensive language).
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Justice Stevens, acting in his role as a judge, is unwilling to relegate
the common-law lawyer to such a marginal role. He adopts an approach
to statutory interpretation that defers to legislative language, yet also
shows concern for case-by-case adjudication and individual dignity. The
way in which he achieves that accommodation is the subject of the re-
mainder of this Article. Section A explains why statutory interpretation
is a special problem for a common law lawyer like Justice Stevens: The
common law lawyer's instinct for case-by-case deliberation runs counter
to a tendency to defer to the plain meaning of statutory generalizations.
Section B discusses how Justice Stevens defers to legislation, preferring to
rely on legislative competence and on the plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage. Section C deals with his less-than-deferential reconstruction of
legislative intent, which draws him away from the plain meaning of the
statutory language to focus on the facts of a specific case and his concern
for individual dignity.
A. Deference to Plain Meaning Versus Reconstruction of Legislative
Intent
Statutes present a serious problem to a common law lawyer. Rather
than advancing a case-by-case development of the law, as the common
law does, statutes provide general principles of law.255 Moreover, unlike
a judicial opinion, statutory language is not separable into a holding ap-
plicable to a particular case and generalized dictum.256
Historically, there were additional reasons explaining why common
law lawyers objected to statutes. In general, statutes advanced contro-
versial political reforms.257 Lawyers also held an idealized image of judi-
cial rationality and a negative image of the quality of legislation. 258
255. Private bills, providing relief for specific individuals from the unintended effects of legisla-
tion, are an exception, and are viewed as such. See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1684, 1684 (1966).
256. United States v. Perryman, 100 U.S. 235, 238 (1879) (Waite, C.J.) (statute could not be
broadened to include a black defendant when language explicitly covered only "white persons").
Significantly, statutes which were part of the common law could be interpreted as though they were
common law principles, capable of flexible application to new facts. Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4
Paige Ch. 178, 198-99 (N.Y. 1833) (statutory law of England became part of New York common law
when it was introduced into the colony of New York).
The distinction between rigid general statutory rules and flexible case-by-case adjudication was
an important theme in the 19th century debates about codification. Common law lawyers argued
that statutory codes could not adjust to unforeseen facts. See C. COOK, supra note 13, at 103-04.
257. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387 (1908) (lack of judicial
sympathy for social and legal reforms).
258. Id. at 383-84 ("It is fashionable to point out the deficiencies of legislation .... It is fashion-
able to preach the superiority of judge-made law"); Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in
Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 441 (1950) (English judges of Cobe's genera-
tion were encouraged to control statutes by "refusing to extend their application at the expense of
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These historical objections are less significant today: statutory reform is
politically more popular, and judicial rationality is viewed more skepti-
cally. Further, contemporary legislatures are more technically proficient
than their predecessors. 25 9 Although many of the historical concerns
about legislation have faded, an ineradicable difference between statutory
generality and case-by-case common law decisionmaking persists. This
distinction is the central problem that a common law lawyer confronts in
the modern world of legislative initiative.260
For a deferential judge, the distinction between the common law
and statutes creates a tension that did not appear in our prior discussion
of judicial restraint. In the earlier discussion, judicial restraint was char-
acterized by both deference to another decisionmaker and limiting the
decision to the facts of the particular case.261 Judicial restraint in statu-
tory interpretation, however, leads the judge to defer to the plain mean-
ing of the statute's general language, without worrying too much about
how the legislature would apply the statute to the particular case. Defer-
ence to the plain meaning of a statute implements judicial restraint be-
cause the plain meaning is the interpretation most easily reached. By
contrast, when a judge tries to guess how the legislature would apply a
statute to the facts of a particular case, she is drawn into time-consuming
and controversial speculation about legislative intent. Deference to plain
meaning therefore minimizes the judicial workload and reduces the risk
of allowing judicial values to intrude into the decision. At the same time,
however, this more restrained approach conflicts with the common law
lawyer's instinct to focus on the facts of a particular case.262
The difference between judicial deference to plain meaning and the
search for how legislative intent would apply in a particular case is often
papered over by the suggestion that both approaches are informed by the
same evidence. The plain (or common, or ordinary) meaning of language
common law principles."); Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 COL. L. REV.
681, 695-98 (1951) (lawyers were well aware of errors in legislation and thought of case law as a
natural, rational, and "organic" growth); Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 12-14 (1936) (common opinion that "the common law was a complete and perfect sys-
tem" and that statute making lacked in quantity and quality).
259. See generally Note, The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1185 (1983).
260. The rigidity of statutes as compared to the common law can be exaggerated. Statutory
generalizations can adjust to new facts if they contain delegations to courts or agencies to develop
the law, either by incorporating common law language, adopting flexible open-ended terms, or by
explicit delegation language. See, eg., Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 544
(1983) (statute can plainly hand court the power to create and revise a form of common law).
261. See supra section II.A.
262. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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is considered the best evidence of legislative intent,263 and a statute's con-
text illuminates both the meaning of the language and the intent of the
legislature. This convergence of the two approaches to statutory inter-
pretation is shattered, however, by the role context plays in reconstruc-
tion of legislative intent and the unsettling effect it has on the judicial
role.
Context is an open-ended concept that includes an ever-widening
circle of material-the shared conceptions of how particular words are
used at the time a statute is passed, the historical mischief animating (or
prompting) the passage of a law, legislative intent to solve a specific prob-
lem, more general purposes underlying the statute, and, finally, the back-
ground considerations (such as traditional social and political values)
affecting the legislature's action.264 The plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage can usually be determined, if it exists, by considering only the way
in which language was used when the statute was passed and, perhaps,
the historical mischief at which the statute was aimed.2 65 But recon-
structing legislative intent cannot privilege any of the particular elements
that constitute context. All context is potentially important for a judge
trying to recreate how legislative intent applies to a case. Not only must
a judge consider the broader elements of context that are less important
when the plain meaning of the statutory language is the critical issue, but
he also must adopt a less restrained approach to statutory interpretation.
Judicial restraint is more difficult because the significance of broader ele-
ments of context for statutory meaning is very uncertain; the more evi-
dence there is of statutory meaning the more choice the judge has; and
the meaning indicated by context may conflict with the plain meaning of
the statutory language. The two approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion-deference to plain meaning and reconstruction of legislative in-
tent-therefore should be understood as divergent approaches with
different implications for the judicial role.
Equating judicial deference to the plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage with judicial restraint is subject to two important caveats. First,
the decision to defer to plain meaning is not necessarily based on a defer-
ential frame-of-mind. Some commentators favor judicial deference for
263. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 373 (1986) (Burger, C.J., majority) (since statute by its language applied to "banks," insti-
tutions that were "functionally equivalent to banks" but not banks per se could not be regulated by
the statute).
264. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
103-36 (1975).
265. This approach to determining plain meaning was adopted by both majority and dissent in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), although they disagreed on what meaning was
plain. Compare id. at 420 with id. at 452-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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political reasons-such as allowing individual reliance on plain mean-
ing266 or furthering 19th century liberal views of limited government. 267
Second, deference to language may be a vehicle for the most aggressive
judicial approach to statutes, as when judges update old law in light of
contemporary policy by applying the contemporary, rather than histori-
cal, meaning of statutory language. 268 These activist justifications for ju-
dicial restraint nonetheless may lead to a restrained approach to the
statute's text if they lead uniformly to deference to plain meaning rather
than selective application in furtherance of political objectives. With
these two qualifications, judicial restraint in the form of deference to
plain meaning is a coherent conception of the judicial role. Its tension
with the judge's inclination to reconstruct legislative intent in particular
cases must be resolved.
Most judges try to have it both ways. They usually defer to lan-
guage, except when legislative intent points more or less strongly in an-
other direction. The differences among judges stems from what they
consider as evidence of legislative intent and how strong that evidence
must be before the language is subverted. The remainder of this essay
explains Justice Stevens' resolution of these issues.
Justice Stevens is a particularly good judge for a study of statutory
interpretation because of his concern with statutes. Out of the 369 Court
opinions issued from the time he came to the Court on December 19,
1975, until the end of the 1988 Term that deal with a statutory issue,
Justice Stevens wrote either a dissent or a separate concurrence in 240
decisions (over half). 269 Of these 240, 90 were solo dissents.270 The large
number of cases involving statutes in which Justice Stevens wrote sepa-
rate opinions and solo dissents is consistent with the overall impression
that he takes statutes more seriously than any of his colleagues.271 The
most dramatic impressionistic support for this conclusion is Justice Ste-
vens' authorship of four substantive dissents in statutory interpretation
266. R. DICKERSON, supra note 264, at 10-11; Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541, 595 (1988).
267. Easterbrook, supra note 260, at 549-50; see also Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legis-
lation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986)
(sticking to plain meaning raises cost of private interest legislation).
268. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 672, 675 (1987); cf. Braschi v. Stahl As-
soc., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) ("family" includes gay couple).
269. This excludes 127 opinions in memorandum cases and six opinions as a circuit judge. The
statutory decisions include thirty three cases where constitutional issues were also present, twelve
cases interpreting federal procedural rules, and six cases interpreting treaties.
270. These include cases where Justice Stevens dissented in part and concurred in part.
271. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note I, at 15 (commenting on how many dissents, especially solo
dissents, Justice Stevens writes).
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cases that attracted only a per curiam majority opinion.2 72 One of these
was a solo dissent in a tax case,273 a substantive area of the law that the
Court is "innate[ly] reluctan[t] to review." 274
B. Judicial Deference and the Plain Meaning of Statutory Language
Justice Stevens is as concerned with unrestrained judging in statu-
tory interpretation as with lack of judicial restraint in other areas of the
law. He is wary of judicial statesmanship in statutory interpretation,275
by which a court works out sensible solutions to problems that would be
better addressed by the legislature. Thus, he objected to the majority's
adoption of a "wise" rule masquerading in the guise of statutory interpre-
tation, a rule that required specific intent by the defendant to support a
criminal but not a civil violation of a statute: "No matter how wise the
new rule that the Court adopts today may be, I believe it is an amend-
ment only Congress may enact. ' 276 In the same vein, he could not un-
derstand how a statute that was silent about private remedies could
support an injunctive, but not a monetary, remedy. 277 According to Jus-
tice Stevens' view, working out solutions to difficult problems that are
unsupported by the statutory language is not a judicial function. Such
judicial restraint in dealing with statutes is also implicit in Justice Ste-
vens' acceptance of the "gap filler" rhetoric of statutory interpretation,
which posits that courts fill statutory gaps left or created by the legisla-
ture.278 He distinguishes sharply between "filling a gap left by Congress'
272. Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 360
(1982) (dissenting) (differing with majority on the interpretation of languages in Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 10 (1981) (dissenting) (applicable statute of limita-
tions should run from date of actual termination of employment and not from the earlier date of
notice of intention to terminate); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 8 (1981) (dissenting)
(differing with majority on the interpretation of language in Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 501);
Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268, 268 (1976) (dissenting) (state
court's interpretation of the statute should be given deference in defining legal obligations of the
parties).
273. HCSC-Laundry, 450 U.S. at 8.
274. Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 123 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
275. Cf Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) (concurring
in the judgment) ("We are not statesmen; we are judges.").
276. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 474 (1978) (concurring in part
and dissenting in part); cf Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 273 n.1 (1980) (concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (Court "reforms" statute to require specific intent to relinquish citizenship when
individual takes an oath of allegiance to another country).
277. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 636 (1983) (dissenting) (majority
reaches "novel conclusion").
278. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104
(1987) (dissenting) (inevitable that Congress will leave "open spaces" that courts are implicitly au-
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silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifi-
cally enacted. '279
Justice Stevens' deferential approach to statutes manifests itself in
two ways that will be addressed in the next section. First, he has a well-
developed sense of the comparative competence of courts and legisla-
tures. Second, he prefers to rely on the plain meaning of statutory
language.
1. Comparative Competence.
Justice Stevens' sensitivity to the comparative competence of courts
and other institutions280 means that courts should avoid overburdening
themselves with work they cannot do well and that legislative responsi-
bility should be enhanced. Judicial restraint in statutory interpretation
does not rest on separation of powers concerns, but on a more pragmatic
foundation.
Judicial workload concerns are, as always, a persistent theme. Stare
decisis in statutory interpretation is an especially attractive doctrine be-
cause it reduces the judge's workload:
The doctrine of stare decisis is not a straitjacket that forecloses re-ex-
amination of outmoded rules. The doctrine does, however, provide
busy judges with a valid reason for refusing to remeasure a delicate
balance that has tipped in the same direction every time the conflicting
interests have been weighed. s281
thorized to fill); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Gaps in the law must, of course, be filled by judicial construction.").
279. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (majority).
280. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
281. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 594 (1979) (dissenting in part); see also Fink, 483 U.S. at
104 (dissenting) (citing Cardozo's observation that the "labor of judges would be increased almost to
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case"); Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 482 U.S. at 258 (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stare decisis in statutory interpreta-
tion serves "the compelling need to preserve the courts' limited resources"); Stevens, supra note 201,
at 2. See generally Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
JUSTICE STEVENS ADHERED TO stare decisis despite substantive disagreement with the interpre-
tation of a statute in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (concurring) (following
Weber); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 293 (1987) (concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (same); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 191 (1980)
(concurring) (following Sheffield); Dougherty County v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978) (concurring)
(same).
Prior dictum and distinguishable prior holdings, however, do not require application of stare
decisis, See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (dissenting) ("Since none of our prior hold-
ings is on point, the doctrine of stare decisis is not controlling."); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (dissenting) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J.)) (Court owes "less deference to a decision that was rendered without
benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations"); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 304 (1987) (dissenting) (free to reexamine limitations on sovereign immunity issue because
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According to this doctrine, the Court even should avoid reviewing prior
judicial interpretations of a statute when the decision is by a lower court
rather than the Supreme Court: "Even if it is a consensus of lower fed-
eral-court decisions, rather than a decision by this Court, that has pro-
vided the answer to a question left open or ambiguous in the original text
of the statute, there is really no need for this Court to revisit the
issue."28 2
Beyond a concern about workload, however, Justice Stevens under-
stands that courts are simply not very good at handling many issues. He
refers to the "chancellor's clumsy foot" as an argument against a particu-
lar judicial interpretation of a statute.283 And he insists, "When judges
are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should care-
fully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to
perform the task at hand. '2 84 He clearly prefers that Congress take re-
sponsibility for the political, empirical, and technological issues
presented by many cases of statutory interpretation. 285
Adherence to stare decisis in cases interpreting statutes not only
reduces judicial workload, but also enhances legislative responsibility by
"encourag[ing Congress] to give close scrutiny to judicial interpretations
of its work product. ' 28 6 Judges "should structure our principles of statu-
Court has expanded immunity beyond prior cases); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S.
545, 575 (1983) (dissenting) (stating that the majority acknowledges that the question presented was
reserved, but not directly answered, by an earlier decision); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 139-
46 (1981) (majority).
282. Finl 483 U.S. at 104; cf McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (dissenting)
(Court should not reject longstanding, consistent interpretation of a federal statute by federal and
state courts). See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
283. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335 (1982) (dissenting); cf Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (concurring) (rulemaking better performed by legislature than
"clumsy judicial fiat").
284. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1988) (dissenting) (denying
cause of action against government contractors).
285. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (majority) ("Congress is in a far better position
than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the
efficiency of the civil service."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431, 456 (1984) (majority) (Congress "never contemplated such a calculus of interests"; "may well
be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology"); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 551 (1983) (majority) ("The Legislative Branch of the Federal Government is
far better equipped than we are to perform a comprehensive economic analysis and to fashion the
proper general rule."); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (majority) ("far
better course is for [Congress] to specify [whether there is a private cause of action] when it creates
those rights"); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979) (majority) ("empirical data" needed to
decide whether appointed counsel are reluctant to take cases if they are not granted immunity); see
generally Jones, supra note 228, at 216 (1983) (discussing a standing congressional committee to
clarify and correct legislation).
286. Fink, 483 U.S. at 104; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
354 (1982) (majority) ("By articulating the rules of law with some clarity and by adhering to rules
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tory construction to invite continuing congressional oversight of the in-
terpretive process. '287 Rhetorically, Justice Stevens often states that
cases interpreting a statute become part of the statute,288 but that view
makes sense only as a technique for encouraging legislative review of
prior interpretations, not as an inference about legislative intent.
The argument for deferring to congressional competence to resolve
interpretive issues depends on congressional awareness of a problem, and
it is therefore not surprising to find Justice Stevens frequently observing
that the legislature is aware of an issue:
[I]f Congress had intended to forbid any further contributions to the
New Jersey Spill Fund-the existence of which it was acutely aware-it
surely could have expressed that intent in less ambiguous language
than is found in § 114(c). Indeed, if that had been its purpose, I would
expect it to be revealed either in a committee report or in some une-
quivocal comment during the debates on the legislation. 289
Although the rhetoric of congressional awareness is often presented
as an argument about legislative intent, the evidence that the legislature
had the intent attributed to it is usually weak. It is more likely that legis-
lative awareness itself is a reason for judicial deference to the status quo
so that the issue is left to legislative resolution. Thus, even when the
legislature seems to have intended a common law power to survive pas-
sage of legislation, Justice Stevens sometimes refers to legislative aware-
ness to justify judicial restraint. 290 And the independent significance of
that are justified in their general application, however, we enhance the legislative prerogative to
amend the law.").
287. Fink 483 U.S. at 104; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 109 S.
Ct. 1917, 1923 (1989) (dissenting) (application of stare decisis to decision which Congress let stand
for three and a half decades depends more on the judge's "view about the respective lawmaking
responsibilities of Congress and this Court than on conflicting policy interests").
288. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2269 (1989) (concurring) ("[lit is the
Court's construction of the statute-rather than the views of an individual Justice-that becomes a
part of the law."); Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584,
2601 (1989) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S.
539, 546 (1988) (majority); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 382 (1986) (dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 385 (1980)
(majority) ("In light of the careful attention paid to when various provisions were to be effective,
Congress surely would have made explicit any intent to limit this important provision to a mere
transitionary role.").
290. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978) (majority) (common law
power to allow loss of society damages did not survive specific reference to pecuniary damages in
statute).
The same argument explains why judges say that the legislature did not intend additional provi-
sions to be read into a statute which is already cluttered with detail. The mere existence of statutory
detail, though presented as evidence of legislative intent, is better understood as demonstrating con-
gressional awareness of an issue, thereby supporting judicial deference. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines
v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (majority) ("The presumption that a
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legislative awareness is obvious when the interpretation to which Justice
Stevens defers is issued after adoption of the statute.291 Legislative
awareness of a later interpretation sheds no light on prior legislative in-
tent292 and can justify judicial deference only if awareness itself justifies
judicial restraint.
2. Plain Meaning.
The easiest way for a judge to exercise restraint when interpreting a
statute is to defer to the plain meaning of statutory language.293 Justice
Stevens' comments on Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill294 link defer-
ence to statutory language to "respect for the law."' 295 The case involved
a statute that protected endangered species from adverse government ac-
tion. The statutory language appeared to prohibit building a dam that
endangered the near-extinct snail darter. Despite the dramatic economic
impact of stopping construction of an almost-completed dam, the Court
adhered to the language of the statutory prohibition over Justice Powell's
dissent that the result was absurd.296 Justice Stevens made the following
comment about the Court's decision, which he characterized as deferring
to the "flat ban" contained in a clear statutory "command": 297 "The
decision in TVA v. Hill did not depend on any peculiar or unique statu-
tory language. Nor did it rest on any special interest in snail darters.
remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a compre-
hensive legislative scheme . . . ."). But see Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 839
(1976) (dissenting) ("The burden of persuading us that we should interpolate such an important
provision [denying a private remedy in a civil rights case] into a complex, carefully drafted statute is
a heavy one.").
291. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2132 (1989) (dissenting) (Con-
gress frequently revisits statutory scheme which majority overturns); Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v.
Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 43 & n.4 (1987) (dissenting) ("Congress has not seen fit to amend the statute in
light of [prior] decisions," though it has amended the statute "on at least four occasions."); Square
D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) (majority) ("careful, intense, and
sustained congressional attention" to the area of the law previously interpreted); FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 713-14 (1979) (dissenting) ("Since Congress has not seen fit to modify the
scope of the statute as construed," Congress also explicitly left issue to agency in analogous situa-
tions.); cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 784 (1984) (dissenting) (an
interpreted "rule that Congress did not revise at any point in the last four decades").
292. See generally Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional
and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982) ("[I]t is crucial that we resist the temptation to
treat either text or silence as mere eyidence of unenacted ideas of desires on the part of others.").
The Court has repeatedly warned that the use of post-enactment history can be dangerous.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 261-68.
294. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Burger, C.J.). The Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill case has become
something of a litmus test for modern judges willing to search beyond the plain statutory language.
See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 20-23 (1986).
295. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335 (1982) (dissenting).
296. T. V.A., 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
297. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 331-32 (dissenting).
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The decision reflected a profound respect for the law and the proper allo-
cation of lawmaking responsibilities in our Government. '298
Justice Stevens backs up his reliance on the plain meaning with fre-
quent references to the most "natural," 299 "normal, ' ' 3°° or "readily ap-
parent" 301 reading of the text. Similarly, "[iln construing a federal
statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the lan-
guage that Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative pur-
pose.' ",302 He characterizes his own deference to statutory language as a
"rather old-fashioned and simple approach to the statute" 3 3-a
"straightforward approach. ' 30 4 In response to a charge that his interpre-
298. Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
299. ICC v. Texas, 479 U.S. 450, 456-57 (1987) (majority) (arguing that the more natural read-
ing of the statute does not suggest that a rail carrier can be regarded as a "motor carrier"); United
States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 459 (1983) (majority) (natural readings are corrobo-
rated by other sections of a statute); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 418 (1978)
(concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (insisting that it is "crystal clear" that the
"natural meaning" of title VI is to prohibit affirmative action).
300. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 862 (1984) (dissenting).
301. Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 984 (1986) (dissenting).
302. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (majority) (emphasis added); cf
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1988) (majority) ("common usage").
303. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 844 (1985) (dissenting); see also Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 606 (1981) (dis-
senting) (referring to the Court's "unusual construction of rather plain statutory language").
304. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 700 (1983) (dissenting) ("language of § 307(f) is
straightforward"); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 770 (1980) (concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("rather straightforward approach to the statutory language"); Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818 (1980) (majority) ("straightforward"); see also United States v. Foster
Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 49 (1976) (concurring) ("the statutory language seems rather plain");
United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180, 207 (1978) (dissenting) ("[ihe statutory language
is plain and unambiguous.").
Justice Stevens is also committed to the constitutional text. He frequently refers to the clear or
plain language of the Constitution. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 230 (1986) (dissent-
ing) ("If we respect the plain language of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution and the Seventeenth
Amendment ... we must answer [the] question in the negative."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 960 (1984) (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("It is appropriate to
begin with the plain language of the Fourth Amendment .. "); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 287 (1984) (dissenting) ("The question is not one of 'deference,' nor one of 'central pur-
poses'. . . . The question is whether the provision in this case is an exercise of a power expressly
conferred upon the States by the Constitution. It plainly is."); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
244 (1980) (concurring in the judgment) ("[I]n determining whether the privilege is applicable, the
question is whether petitioner was in a position to have his testimony compelled and then asserted
his privilege, not simply whether he was silent. A different view ignores the clear words of the Fifth
Amendment.") (footnotes omitted); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327 (1978) (dissenting)
("The Court's approach disregards the plain language of the Warrant Clause and is unfaithful to the
balance struck by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.").
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tation of a statute is a "semantic quibble," he stated that "[p]roper defer-
ence to the powers of Congress requires exactly that result." 30 5
By contrast, too quick an appeal to the statute's general purpose, cut
loose from statutory language, can lead the Court astray. This may oc-
cur because of the risk that personal policy preferences will intrude into
the decision 30 6 or because the court is unfaithful to a legislative compro-
mise.307  Justice Stevens states: "If th[e] question could be answered
solely by reference to the Act's broad remedial purposes, it might be an
easy one. But on the basis of the statute as written, the question is not
nearly as simple as the Court implies. '30
Justice Stevens frequently focuses his opinion on careful attention to
the statute's language. 309 He chides his colleagues for not following the
305. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 750 (1985) (dissenting); see also Young
v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (dissenting) ("The task of interpreting a
statute requires more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference.").
306. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(majority) ("Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis
of the judges' personal policy preferences."); cf Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (concurring) (personal policy views on minimum wage and forced
age retirement irrelevant to decision).
307. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666,
1677 (1988) (dissenting) (objects to Court not following Mohasco); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 281 (1980) (majority) (statutory
compromise is both pro-employee and pro-employer); Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 818-20, 826 (com-
promise after cloture petition).
308. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 140 (1978) (dissenting); see also United
States v. John Doe, Inc. 1, 481 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (majority) ("Because we decide this case based
on our reading of the Rule's plain language, there is no need to address the parties' arguments [about
the threatened values of grand jury privacy] .... "); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162
(1976) (dissenting) ("[Wlithout reaching the questions of motive, administrative expertise, and pol-
icy, which Mr. Justice Brennan so persuasively exposes, or the question of effect to which Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Blackmun refer, I conclude that the language of the statute plainly requires
the result which the Courts of Appeals have reached unanimously.").
Of course, general statutory purposes and other policies can be relied on when the language
provides no guidance at all. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 (1986) (majority) (attorneys fees
can be waived in settlement of civil rights case); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498
(1980) (majority) (tell jury about tax exemption for Federal Employers' Liability Act awards); Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 585 (1978) (dissenting) (transaction was a second mortgage
for tax purposes); see also Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 520 (1980) (majority) (state receives land of
equal value in exchange for land taken by federal government).
309. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct. 2722, 2731-33 (1988) (majority) (the meaning of
"money" in "money damages" refers to compensatory damages, not equitable relief); United States
Indus./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 455 U.S.
608, 615 (1982) (majority) (court of appeals misapplied the term "injury" as used in the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 920(a)); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. 322, 343 (1981) (dissenting) ("representative" is the statutory term, not "trustee," as the major-
ity opinion keeps saying).
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"customary" practice of beginning an analysis with the text. 310 When he
disagrees with another judge's use of statutory purpose to interpret a
statute, he anchors his decision in particular statutory language.31' And
when he disagrees with decisions that rely on plain meaning, he often
states that the meaning is not so plain.312
Justice Stevens also worries more than most judges about the
problems raised by deference to the plain meaning of language. He self-
consciously focuses on the common historical understanding of the
words at the time the statute was adopted.313 He worries about an often-
neglected question arising from reliance on the plain meaning: to what
audience is the meaning plain. Statutes can have different audiences; in
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, b~e hypothesized both a lay audience and one
310. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 573 (1983) (dissenting) ("Although it is
customary for the Court to begin its analysis of questions of statutory construction by examining the
text of the relevant statute, one may search in vain for any textual support for the Court's holding
today."); see also Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 345 (1984) (dissenting) ("first
note ... the plain language of [the Act]"); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 342 (1983) (dissenting) ("The Court should begin its analysis
with the language of the statute itself.").
311. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 631, 642 (1984) (concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("A careful reading of the plain language of the relevant statutes indicates that the
statutory scheme does not preclude jurisdiction"; Court's majority decision stems in part from con-
cern with flooding the courts.); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 87, 89 (1982)
(dissenting) (plan must be "bona fide"; Court's majority view based on "assumption that if the
Griggs standard were applied to the adoption of a post-Act seniority system, most post-Act systems
would be unlawful").
312. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986) (dissenting) ("changing the party against
whom a claim is asserted" is the language of the rule to be interpreted before applying a four-part
test); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 401-02 (1984) (dissenting) ("The plain language of
§ 6501(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code conveys a different message to me than it does to the
Court."); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 862 (1984) (dissenting) (The government's interpre-
tation of the Act is not the meaning that" 'first springs' to my mind."); Bifulco v. United States, 447
U.S. 381, 403 (1980) (dissenting) ("statutory language conveys quite a different meaning to me");
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 161 (1980) (concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (majority result not "compelled by the plain language of the statute"); cf
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 123 (1986) (dissenting) (Justice Stevens
uses legislative purpose, which is to prevent unfair competition, to determine that there is no "trade
or business"); Id at 111 (the Court thought that "trade or business" literally described the activity
of the tax-exempt organization).
313. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370 (1987) (dissenting) (definition of "fraud" at the
time statute adopted); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 615-16 (1986) (dissenting) ("damage" is
term in statute, not "damages," as the majority implies); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
629-30 (1977) (dissenting) (meaning of "envelope" when statute adopted is not same as contempo-
rary meaning); cf. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 174
(1983) (dissenting) ("[Miore accurately reflects the understanding of the Congress that enacted the
statute and the lawyers and businessmen who have lived with the statute on a day-to-day basis for
almost half a century."). But see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 770 (1980) (concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("costs" includes attorneys fees, even though provision for attor-
neys fees post-dates adoption of the "costs" statute). The majority relied heavily on contemporary
context, in which attorneys fees were not "costs." Id. at 759.
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which reads the statute "carefully," and found that the statute produced
the same result in either case.314
To Justice Stevens, deference to plain meaning includes an examina-
tion of surrounding language-the "internal context." He rejects a "blue
pencil" interpretation, which ignores adjacent text.315 Further, he does
not believe that the plain meaning of a word is a black box that com-
pletely contains the meaning of the language. Plain meaning is always
potentially contextual-plain with respect to the choices presented to the
Court, but leaving other issues to be decided in another case.316
C. Judicial Reconstruction of Legislative Intent
1. The Ultimate Appeal to Legislative Intent.
Despite his emphasis on plain meaning, Justice Stevens' ultimate crite-
rion for determining statutory meaning is legislative intent, explicitly
linked to case-by-case consideration of the facts of a case:
In final analysis, any question of statutory construction requires the
judge to decide how the legislature intended its enactment to apply to
the case at hand. The language of the statute is usually sufficient to
answer that question, but "the reports are full of cases" in which the
will of the legislature is not reflected in a literal reading of the words it
has chosen. In my opinion this is such a case.317
A preference for legislative intent over plain meaning is often noted by
Justice Stevens. He rejected the "Court's reading of the statutory lan-
guage [which] is faithful to its grammar," but does not "actually reflect[ ]
the intent of Congress, '318 for the important issue is to determine
"whether [the Court's] conclusion could reasonably be thought to repre-
sent the will of Congress. ' 319 These statements qualify Justice Stevens'
assertion that "it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of
the language that Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.' "320 Such an assumption is not always appropriate because leg-
314. 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) (majority).
315. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (majority); see also
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (majority) (relying on surrounding language to
interpret one word).
316. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979) (majority) ("plain language"
does not bear the meaning ascribed by court of appeals, but may or may not include a particular
interpretation not now before the Court).
317. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577 (1982) (dissenting) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180, 211 (1978) (dissenting) ("Occasion-
ally there will be clear manifestations of a contrary intent that justify a nonliteral reading, but surely
this is not such a case.").
318. Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986) (dissenting).
319. Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 U.S. at 590; cf United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 657, 696
(1985) (dissenting) ("common sense" tempers a "starkly literal" interpretation).
320. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (majority).
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islative intent, as reconstructed by the Court, has the potential to unsettle
plain meaning. 321
Justice Stevens' view of legislative history as being capable of dis-
placing plain meaning confirms the priority of legislative intent. He
states: "I would, of course, agree that if there were legislative history
plainly identifying a contrary congressional intent, that history should be
given effect. ' ' 322 Language is always vulnerable to being undermined by
the legislative intent expressed in legislative history.323
When drafting an opinion, Justice Stevens will examine both the
language and the legislative history of a statute, and often finds that the
legislative history is consistent with the plain meaning. 324 This approach
is similar to the common judicial practice of relying on a variety of evi-
dence of statutory meaning to avoid theoretical disputes over which
meaning has priority. Moreover, he shares the view of many judges that
legislative history is sometimes unreliable. For example, legislative his-
321. Similar reasoning explains why Justice Stevens resolves conflict between plain meaning, as
probably understood by the statute's audience, and a legislative definition that is at odds with the
apparent meaning, in favor of the legislative definition. Legislative intent prevails, see Meese v.
Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477 (1987) (majority) (follow "broad, neutral" statutory definition rather than
"pejorative" meaning of political propaganda); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoreman's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 727, 730 (1982) (dissenting) (joining in Chief Justice Burger's
statement that "common sense meaning of a term is not controlling when Congress has provided,...
an explicit definition"); cf. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (majority) (text and
history of regulation prevail over laymen's understanding of regulation).
322. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 863 (1984) (dissenting); see also Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 (1983)
(majority) (the legislative history revealed an intent to overrule the reasoning and not just the hold-
ing of a prior case dealing with disability benefits for male dependents of pregnant females; the
dissent, id. at 687, asserted that Justice Stevens was not following the statute's language); cf United
States v. Weber Aircraft Co., 465 U.S. 792, 802 (1984) (majority) ("[Tihe legislative history of Ex-
emption 5 does not contain the kind of compelling evidence of congressional intent that would be
necessary to persuade us to look beyond the plain statutory language.").
323. It follows, for Justice Stevens, that if the language is not plain, legislative history can be
considered. See, ag., McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 147 (1981) (majority) (The Court looked
to a Committee Report on point; there was "sufficient ambiguity in the statutory language to make it
appropriate to turn to legislative history for guidance.").
.324. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Progrims, 449
U.S. 268, 275 (1980) (majority) ("The legislative history of the Act is entirely consistent with the
conclusion that it was intended to mean what it says."); Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co.,, 108 S. Ct. 830, 835-36 (1988) (majority) (language and legisla-
tive history agree); see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
431 (1987) (majority) (plain language and history agree); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 618
(1986) (dissenting) (legislative history consistent with interpretation of language); Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 703 (1983) (dissenting) (language and legislative history agree); Illinois v.
Abbot & Assocs., 460 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1983) (majority) (language and legislative history agree);
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 822 (1980) (majority) (plain meaning and legislative history
agree).
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tory is often unclear 325 and not well edited. 326 But checking up on the
legislative intent expressed in legislative history is much more than a rhe-
torical after-thought. In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens reasserted his view that legislative history
can displace plain meaning,327 a position taken in the face of Justice
Scalia's explicit challenge. Justice Scalia's concurrence stated that clear
language must prevail over legislative history (absent "patent absurd-
ity")328 because the Court should be "interpret[ing] laws rather than re-
construct[ing the] legislators' intentions. 329
2. When To Pierce the Linguistic Veil.
a. The uncertain standard. When will Justice Stevens look be-
yond the statutory language? When, as Justice Scalia describes it, should
the judge "reconstruct [the] legislators' intention"? 330 A few out-of-con-
text statements indicating that legislative intent can trump plain meaning
do not adequately convey how Justice Stevens strikes the balance be-
tween text and reconstructed intent. He will only reject plain meaning in
the "appropriate" case.
There is a traditional standard for rejecting plain meaning known as
the Golden Rule, which permits the judge to disregard the text to pre-
vent patent absurdity.331 Justice Stevens would not, however, limit re-
325. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 427 (1984) (majority)
("There is, as always, some ambiguity in the legislative history."); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 581 (1977) (concurring in the judgment) ("Interpreting legislative history
is sometimes a perplexing and uncertain task.").
326. J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 605 n.16 (1978) (dissenting) ("a committee
report is not edited as carefully as the bill itself"); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 864-65
(1984) (dissenting) (Committee Report "casually uses the prepositional phrase 'arising out of' to
introduce a truncated list of the exceptions.... It is nothing more than an introduction. In such an
introduction, precision of meaning is naturally and knowingly sacrificed in the interest of brevity.").
327. 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (majority):
[ ]e look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is "clearly expressed
legislative intention" contrary to [the enactment's] language, which would require us to
question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it
chooses.
328. Id. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
329. Id. Justices Stevens and Scalia also differed about legislative history in two other cases.
Compare Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1985-92 (1989) (majority) and
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 430-37 (1988) (dissenting) with Green, 109 S. Ct. at
1994 (Sealia, J., concurring in the judgment) and Pittston, 109 S. Ct. at 423 (Sealia, J., majority).
330. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53.
331. See, eg., Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1985 ("no matter how plain the text of the Rule may be"
statute is unfathomable if civil plaintiff does not have same right to impeach adversary's testimony as
civil defendant does). One judge's concept of "patent absurdity" may, of course, differ from an-
other's. In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586 (1982) (dissenting), for example,
Justice Stevens characterized as "absurd" the payment of over $300,000 damages to an employee
denied less than $500 wages, but the majority thought the result made sense as punitive damages.
1151Vol. 1989:1087]
1152 DUKE LAW JOURNAIZ [Vol. 1989:1087
construction of legislative intent to cases of "absurdity." His opinions set
forth several more expansive standards for piercing the linguistic veil.
"If this purely literal reading of [the statute] resulted in manifest injus-
tice, or were plainly at war with the probable intent of Congress, I would
reject it."'332 And, in somewhat less restrictive terms, he states:
When we are dealing with a well-established and clearly defined old
rule, it is usually reasonable to suppose that the legislative intent to
change such a rule would be unambiguously expressed. Or if we are
dealing with an old rule that is an established and important part of
our national policy, we must be sure that it is not changed simply by
inadvertent use of broad statutory language. 333
These tests for piercing the veil of statutory language are versions of
the "clear statement" doctrine, which posits that certain substantive re-
sults will be inferred only when the statutory language clearly impels
it.334 Justice Stevens applies this doctrine when he rejects the apparent
meaning of the statutory language because it produces results that he
"cannot believe" the legislature intended 335 without a clear statement to
that effect, 336 especially if Congress seems unaware of what it is doing.337
Although the "clear statement" doctrine is often criticized as being judi-
Id. at 572 (Rehnquist, J., majority); see also Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 426, 429
(1988) (dissenting) (majority result "senseless" and "absurd"); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450
U.S. 503, 530 (1981) (dissenting) (majority decision lead to an "absurd result"),
Perhaps the easiest case for finding "absurdity" is when the language of the statute is inconsis-
tent. In such cases, there is no need to appeal to substantive criteria outside the text to demonstrate
absurdity; see, eg., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 250
(1985) (majority) (literal interpretation leads to internal inconsistencies in the text); cf Park'n Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 218 (1985) (dissenting) (Justice Stevens argued that it
would violate congressional intent "to grant incontestable status to a mark that was not eligible for
registration in the first place").
332. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 379 (1986) (dissenting).
333. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 164 (1976) (dissenting); see also Illinois
v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1983) (majority) ("But the rule is so important, and
so deeply rooted in our traditions, that we will not infer that Congress has exercised such a power
without affirmatively expressing its intent to do so"; the tradition in this case was grand jury
secrecy.).
334. See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982).
335. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 123 (1985) (dissenting) ("I cannot believe that
Congress intended the words 'prior to December 31 of each year' to be given the literal reading the
Court adopts today.") (case involved loss of livelihood); see also Third Nat'l Bank v. IMPAC, Ltd.,
432 U.S. 312, 323 (1977) (majority). In IMPAC, Justice Stevens stated: "We cannot believe that
Congress intended to give national banks a license to inflict irreparable injury on others, free from
the normal constraints of equitable relief." The statutory language prohibited an "injunction,"
which the Court interpreted not to apply to injunctions by debtors. The dissent, id. at 324 (Black-
mun,J., dissenting), thought the statute "means what it says."
336. In J.W. Bateson Co., Inc. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 595, 605 (1978) (dissenting),
Justice Stevens rejected what the majority, id. at 590, called the trade usage of the term "subcontrac-
tor." He claimed that the word had a broader meaning than the majority adopted, id. at 601-02, and
further stated: "If Congress had intended to do more than allay that concern-if it had intended to
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cially intrusive, 338 it is in fact the most honest way of describing what
judges do when they question the plain meaning of statutes.
The tests that Justice Stevens adopts to pierce the linguistic veil and
require a clear statement-whether the language produces "manifest in-
justice," or is "at war with the probable [legislative] intent, ' 339 or deals
with "a well-established and clearly defined old rule" or "an established
cut back on the coverage of the Heard Act-I am convinced that it would have used statutory
language to accomplish its purpose." Id at 605.
"Clear statement," "cannot believe," and similar phrases also appear in opinions that do not
pierce the linguistic veil. They express a substantive point of view that resolves issues left open by
the language. See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 382 (1986) (dissenting) ("[W]e should
not presume pre-emption unless Congress clearly identifies its intent to curtail the lawmaking power
of a sovereign State .. "); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 463 U.S. 582, 636, 638 (1983)
(dissenting) ("Yet it seems to me most improbable that Congress contemplated so significant and
unusual limitation on the fQrms of relief available to a victim of racial discrimination, but said abso-
lutely nothing about it in the text of the statute."); Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 225, 229
(1981) (dissenting) ("It is undisputed that the Youth Corrections Act contains no such clear expres-
sion of congressional intent."); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 402 (1980) (dissenting) ("total
absence of any statement by any legislator"); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 626, 629-30
(1977) (dissenting) ("I do not believe, however, that the word 'envelope' as there used was intended
to refer to ordinary letters.").
337. In Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986) (dissenting), the word
"refund" was not literally applied to refunds which were paid to low income families who had
Earned Income Credits in excess of taxes due. Justice Stevens stated:
With all due respect to the Court and to our hardworking neighbors in the Congress, I
think "it defies belief" to assume that a substantial number of legislators were sufficiently
familiar with OBRA to realize that somewhere in that vast piece of hurriedly enacted
legislation there was a provision that changed the 6-year-old Earned Income Credit Pro-
gram.
If the status quo of which the legislature is unaware has little substantive strength, however,
then unawareness is not an argument for preserving the status quo. For example, when the prior law
consists of a prior case of which Congress was unaware and which it is "inconceivable that Congress
would have wanted" to preserve, then the prior law is superceded by a later statute. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 341 (1983) (dissent-
ing). In such situations, the majority's statement, id. at 325, that there was no evidence of legislative
intent to reject the prior interpretation, is irrelevant in view of its substantive weakness. Cf Labor-
ers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 830, 837
(1988) (majority) (policy arguments support plain intent, which counters inference that the statute's
limited reach is due to "inadvertence rather than deliberate choice").
338. See, eg., Note, supra note 334, at 904-07.
339. See supra note 332 and accompanying text. In routine opinion writing, Justice Stevens will
try to avoid any conflict between language and legislative intent by noting agreement between these
two criteria of statutory meaning. See, ag., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 421
(1982) (dissenting) (literal reading and purpose of Anti-Injunction Act permit injunction in this
case); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 161 (1980) (concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (neither plain language nor congressional purpose leads to majority's
conclusion); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (majority) ("Even if the
statutory language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes."); cf Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352
(1981) (majority) ("Our interpretation of the Rule is consistent with its purpose.").
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and important part of our national policy" 34 0-are very uncertain, and
are even more imprecise than the testing for identifying "patent absurd-
ity.' ' 341 There is no clear image confronting the judge who looks behind
the veil. She must weigh legislative intent in the balance, and must con-
struct that intent from varied sources.342 How Justice Stevens ap-
proaches such a task constitutes his theory of statutory interpretation
and his distinctive blend of judicial restraint and creativity.343
340. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 164 (1976) (dissenting)).
341. See supra note 331.
342. An example of judicial construction of legislative intent under the influence of background
traditions, filtered through a judicial lens, is the inference of private remedies from federal statutes.
Doctrinally, the issue is now whether legislative intent to create a remedy can be demonstrated.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377, 378 (1982) (majority)
(increased complexity and volume of federal legislation prompted further inquiry into legislative
intent); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)
(concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority's approach to
"fashion" remedies is contrary to the Court's history and tradition). But presumptions about legisla-
tive intent which the judges bring to the determination of this issue are shaped by background con-
siderations having little to do with specific legislative intent.
At one time, courts were very willing to infer private remedies if the plaintiff could show that
the statute was enacted for his special benefit. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 374 (1982) (majority).
Some of our most conservative judges accepted this view of judicial power as part of common law
tradition. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 23-24 (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(Justices Harlan, Clark, Frankfurter and Kirkpatrick accepted the special benefit rule); Merrill
Lynch, 456 U.S. at 374-75. Under this earlier approach, judges assumed that the legislative context
of a statute supported inferring a remedy, California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1981)
(concurring) (implication of private cause of action was frequent in both common law and American
courts prior to development of judicial rules); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 381-82, or inferred a rem-
edy by relying on statutory language specifying the class of people benefiting from the statute, Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979) (majority) (looking at the statutory reference
to 1893 railroad legislation).
The recent retreat from this approach, under the guise of searching for legislative intent, has
been driven by a different view of the relevant background traditions. Justice Powell argues that
judicial inference of private remedies without clear evidence of legislative intent violates separation
of powers; see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742-47 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, previously a
strong advocate of inferring private remedies, also has accepted a more restrained approach, but for
different reasons. He has been persuaded to be more cautious in inferring remedies by a familiar
concern, that of avoiding excessive burdens on the federal courts. See supra notes 226-28 and 280-81
and accompanying text; see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 24-25 (concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens
imposed upon the federal judiciary... and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation" has been more
reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured city); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377 ("in-
creased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation").
343. Another example of Justice Stevens' judicial creativity, once he is freed from criteria associ-
ated with judicial restraint, is his approach to stare decisis in statutory interpretation. Even though
manifest error and lack of reliance argue for abandoning stare decisis, consonance of a prior decision
with contemporary mores is a reason for adhering to the prior decision, see Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1988) (dissenting) (Court should not re-examine holding in
Runyon). Moreover, the stare decisis effect of a prior statutory interpretation should not be the
statute's literal meaning, however appropriate a literal interpretation might have been in the first
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b. Applications. Justice Stevens usually uncovers legislative in-
tent behind the language to protect substantive values that, in his view,
deserve the Court's special protection-specifically, that congerie of val-
ues that we earlier summarized under the heading "individual dig-
nity.' ' 344 The substantive concern with individual dignity is applied by
Justice Stevens to statutory interpretation in two ways. First, it is a
background tradition, capable of questioning the impact of all other evi-
dence of statutory meaning. It is the "established and important part of
our national policy" that cannot be inadvertently displaced. Second, this
concern is a background tradition that selectively reinforces evidence of
probable legislative intent "at war" with the literal language.
An example of the first use of individual dignity traditions is Brown
v. Glines, 345 in which Justice Stevens explicitly argued that substantive
values drive statutory interpretation even when both legislative intent, as
indicated by the legislative history, and statutory language agree. The
case concerned whether a statute protected the right of members of the
Air Force to circulate petitions to legislators and executive officials deal-
ing with grooming standards. He stated that "the plain language of the
statute and its sparse legislative history slightly favor the Court's read-
ing," but that in "a doubtful case I believe a statute enacted to remove
impediments to the flow of information to Congress should be liberally
construed. ' 346 Justice Stevens' position in this case should not be dis-
missed as resting on the doctrine that a constitutional interpretation
should be presumed (based on first amendment concerns, in this case);
that presumption is itself based on a substantive bias for background tra-
ditions favoring liberty. The maxim presuming constitutionality of an
Act "is not merely based on a desire to avoid premature adjudication of
constitutional issues. Like others, the maxim also reflects a judicial pre-
sumption concerning the intent of the draftsmen of the language in ques-
tion. '347 Justice Stevens would presume an intent that "err[s] on the side
of fundamental constitutional liberties. '348
place. Once an existing interpretive structure exists, it is wrong to replace "a sense of rational direc-
tion and purpose in the law with an aimless confinement to a narrow construction." Patterson, 109
S. Ct. at 2396; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (concurring) (decision "accords with
the prevailing sense of justice today").
344. See supra section II.B.2.
345. 444 U.S. 348, 378 (1980) (dissenting).
346. Id. at 378-79 (1980) (dissenting).
347. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 697 (1984) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
348. Id. at 697; see also Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 2240-41 (1989) (majority) (not
follow literal language where assignment of felony trial duties to magistrate could be unconstitu-
tional); cf Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 791 (1988) (concurring in the judgment) (con-
struction of denaturalization statute influenced by the burden of the sanction, which may be more
grave than a criminal conviction).
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Similarly, in Mallard v. United States District Court, Justice Stevens
interpreted a statute that permitted federal courts to "request" attorneys
to represent the poor as authority "to respectfully command" such repre-
sentation. 349 In affirming the ancient traditions of the bar to aid the
poor, he explicitly rejected the statute's plain meaning: "This case in-
volves much more than the parsing of the plain meaning of the word
'request' . "...-350
In other cases, background traditions reinforce evidence of legisla-
tive intent that is potentially at war with the literal language. For exam-
ple, in Garcia v. United States,351 the threat posed to our liberties by a
national police force was sufficiently worrisome to call into question the
literal application of the statutory language. Justice Stevens argued that
legislative intent did not support aggrandizement of national police
power, despite the "literal" language: "When the literal application of a
statute would produce a result 'demonstrably at odds with the intentions
of its drafters,' the actual legislative intent must control our disposi-
tion. ' 352 Discouraging a national police force is a strong background
tradition driving Justice Stevens' appeal to legislative intent and perhaps
shaping his judgment as to what that intent is. Thus, he argues that a
national police force should not be inferred lightly from the statutory
language, if it is not "sufficiently plain"353 because "[e]very increase in
the power of the federal prosecutor moves us a step closer to a national
police force with its attendant threats to individual liberty. '35 4
Liberty interests also include the protection of property from arbi-
trary government action. The apparent meaning of a statute threatening
that interest is therefore suspect. For example, United States v. Locke 355
involved a statute that required a filing "prior to December 31" to avoid
loss of property. Though numbers and dates present the clearest case for
deferring to plain statutory language, Justice Stevens refused to defer to
the literal meaning because the language created a "trap for unwary
property owners" by a "legislative accident,"356 and "appellees [would]
lose their entire livelihood for no practical reason. '357 The statute was
349. 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1826 (1989) (dissenting).
350. Id. at 1823.
351. 469 U.S. 70 (1984) (dissenting).
352. Id. at 80.
353. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 88.
354. Id. at 89; cf Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589,
604 (dissenting) (rejecting the majority's reliance on "normal meaning," citing concerns for lenience
in criminal statutes, for preventing a postal monopoly, and for not curtailing communication).
355. 471 U.S. 84, 117 (1985) (dissenting).
356. Id. at 117-18.
357. Id. at 125.
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interpreted by Justice Stevens to mean "on or before December 31.11358
He stated that his position was "fully consistent with the intent of Con-
gress" and did not "interfere with Congress' intent, ' 359 but, once again,
the appeal to intent is influenced by the substantive implications of defer-
ring to plain meaning. His appeals to "consistency" with legislative in-
tent and "lack of interference" with legislative intent do not make out a
strong case rhetorically that the judge has engaged in a careful search for
what the legislature intended. Rather this is the language of judicial re-
construction of legislative intent in light of powerful background consid-
erations such as freedom from arbitrary government action.
Protecting the property rights of the poor from inadvertent govern-
ment harm is also an important value, capable of calling into question the
literal language of a statute. The question in Sorenson v. Secretary of the
Treasury360 was whether an Earned Income Credit, adopted by a 1976
statute and paid as a tax "refund" to poor people, was the kind of "re-
fund" specified in a later 1981 statute. Earned Income Credits paid as
refunds differ from the usual tax refund in that they are the difference
between the amount of the government grant-called an Earned Income
Credit-and the tax owed, rather than an actual overpayment of tax.
The later 1981 statute required people who are delinquent in child sup-
port to pay income tax refunds to the state reimbursing it for payments
the state had made to the child. Justice Stevens refused to interpret the
word "refund" in the later statute to include an Earned Income
Credit.361 He noted that the purpose of the earlier Earned Income Credit
law was to help poor families, and he was "not persuaded that Congress
had any.., intent" to divert Earned Income Credits from poor families
to state governments, 362 especially in view of legislative unawareness that
the term "refund" would apply to Earned Income Credit refunds.
363
Justice Stevens' statement that he was "not persuaded" of a legislative
intent to harm the poor 364 suggests that he was actually reconstructing
the legislature's intent in light of strong background considerations,
358. Id. at 123.
359. Id. at 124.
360. 475 U.S. 851 (1986) (dissenting).
361. Id. at 866-87.
362. Id. at 866.
363. Id at 867.
364. Id. at 866. Another case in which Justice Stevens referred to both legislative intent and
substantive concern for the poor was Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 630 (1984) (concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). He noted that it would "frustrate[ ] the remedial intent of
Congress" and would be a "cruel irony" if the only people able to get review of a refusal to pay
Medicaid benefits (a program for the poor), were those wealthy enough to pay first and sue later. Id.
at 630. He also relied on a "careful reading of the plain language." Id. at 631.
1157Vol. 1989:1087]
1158 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:1087
which included not thoughtlessly repealing a statute intended to help
poor workers. 365
Sometimes individual dignity concerns support close adherence to
the statutory language, rather than piercing the linguistic veil. This ap-
proach mirrors Justice Stevens' occasional preference for judicial gener-
alizations over case-by-case decisionmaking in order to protect liberty
interests.3 66 He makes this point explicitly in tax cases, where the impor-
tance of evenhanded administration and taxpayer reliance 67 on fixed
rules argue strongly for following the statute's plain meaning.3 68
365. By contrast, when Congress acts consciously and rationally in a way that disadvantages the
poor, the statute will not be interpreted to prevent that harm. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569,
577-80, 587, 589-91 (1982) (majority) (statutory eligibility for medical aid to the poor is properly
interpreted to be based on gross income, without subtracting medical expenses to determine need).
366. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
367. Reliance interests are also a major reason for generally applying stare decisis in statutory
interpretation. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976) (concurring); see also Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (concurring) ("public interest in stability and or-
derly development of the law.' "); Lodge 76 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 159 (1976) (dissenting) ("Stability and
predictability in the law are enhanced when the Court resists the temptation to overrule its prior
decisions.").
The interest in stability provided by stare decisis is also important in constitutional decisions,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 780 (1986) (con-
curring) (stare decisis values cannot "be summarily put to one side" in constitutional cases), even
though stare decisis is less weighty in constitutional cases because correction through legislation is
almost impossible. Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104 n.6 (1987) (dissenting) (noting limited
explanation in constitutional cases, but applying stare decisis for shareholder's loss recognition in tax
case).
368. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 416 (1983) (concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Because tax considerations play such an important role in decisions relating to
the investment of capital, the transfer of operating businesses, and the management of going con-
cerns, there is a special interest in the orderly, certain, and consistent interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code."); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180, 207, 211 (1978) (dissenting)
("[T]he statutory language is plain and unambiguous."; "I firmly believe that the best way to achieve
evenhanded administration of our tax laws is to adhere closely to the language used by Congress to
define taxpayers' responsibilities."); cf. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 49 (1976)
(concurring) ("the statutory language seems rather plain"); ; Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 109 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1989) (dissenting) (hazardous to chart course through tax code on
basis of first principles); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (dissenting)
("clear and unambiguous" language exempts taxpayer from tax).
Where the language in the tax law is not clear, however, Justice Stevens appears ready to adopt
an interpretation that prevents tax avoidance. See United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S.
593, 609 (1986) (dissenting) (intepretating tax regulation to forbid accrual of liability, since accrual
would permit tax avoidance); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978) (dissenting)
(interprets the reality of a transaction for tax purposes to be a second mortgage, which meant that
taxpayer would lose); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569, 583 (1977) (concurring)
(taxpayer loses; the word "paid" does not include giving note, but requires delivery of cash or
equivalent). But see Commissioner v. Clark, 109 S. Ct. 1455, 1465-66 (1989) (majority) ("boot"
received in acquisitive reorganization is capital gain; no tax avoidance because transaction is like a
sale); United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1986) (dissenting) ("trade
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Similarly, the evidence of legislative intent found in legislative his-
tory, which Justice Stevens is normally willing to consider,369 may be
disregarded to protect individual dignity values. Thus, an adverse effect
on liberty precludes legislating by "stealthy" legislative history.370 And
legislative history that clearly demonstrated an intent contrary to plain
meaning was not relied on in a tax case, a type of case in which reliance
on statutory language is especially important,371 because "Congress has a
special duty to choose its words carefully when it is drafting technical
and complex laws." 372
Not all of Justice Stevens' opinions piercing the linguistic veil in-
volve individual dignity values. Some cases involve statutes based on the
common law, where "literal interpretation would conflict with the flexi-
ble grant of judicial power characteristic of the common law context. ' 373
And sometimes the conclusion that the plain meaning produces an "ab-
surd" result is flavored with a concern about "manifest injustice" that is
not closely tied to the protection of individual dignity values. For exam-
ple, when over $300,000 in damages were awarded to an employee who
was owed less than $500 in past wages, Justice Stevens looked beyond the
plain language to prevent a result he characterized as "absurd" and "pal-
pably unjust. '3 74
Finally, an occasional opinion rests on the unreasonableness of the
plain meaning, but in which manifest injustice does not appear to be an
issue. For example, Justice Stevens dissented in United States v. Provi-
or business" does not include sale by tax-exempt organization of disability insurance to its members
with the discount in premiums going to the organization).
369. See supra notes 322-29 and accompanying text.
370. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 278-79 (1979) (dissenting) ("My respect for the law-
making process forecloses the inference that Congress authorized burglarious conduct by such
stealthy legislative history"; need "legislative mandate that is both explicit and specific" before na-
tional police officers can invade "privacy interests.")
371. See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
372. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 791 (1981) (con-
curring in the judgment) (declining to use legislative history when referring to plain meaning of
Federal Unemployment Tax Act).
373. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 736-37 (1988) (dissenting) (dis-
cussing the common law origins of the antitrust laws); Associated Gen. Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529-32 (1983) (majority) (same); Antitrust: Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (majority) (common law background
cited in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), on which the Court relies); Civil rights:
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1983) (majority) (statute making "every person" perform-
ing certain action liable is not interpreted literally because of background of common law immunity
doctrine); see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (dissenting) ("Statutes like
the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail fraud statute were written in broad general
language on the understanding that [they are] implicit delegations of authority to the courts to fill in
the gaps in the common-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication.").
374. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586 (1982) (dissenting).
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dence Journal Co., 375 a case addressing the issue whether a lawyer ap-
pointed by the district court to prosecute a contempt charge against the
Executive Branch had authority to represent the United States in the
Supreme Court. The original appointment was necessary because the
contempt charge put the Judiciary at odds with the Executive, creating a
conflict of interest which prevented the Department of Justice from rep-
resenting both the Executive and Judiciary Branches of the government.
The governing statute, however, gave exclusive authority to the Attorney
General and Solicitor General in "all suits in the Supreme Court in
which the United States shall be concerned. 3 76 Justice Stevens argued,
in dissent, that a statute should not be literally interpreted if it would
lead to "absurd or even unreasonable results" especially when the enact-
ing legislature could not have anticipated a conflict of interest among the
branches of government requiring the appointment of outside counsel.3 77
He therefore interpreted the statute to permit outside counsel to prose-
cute the appeal in the Supreme Court. Perhaps Justice Stevens' deep
commitment to the role that lawyers play in resolving disputes,3 78 and
the fact that a conflict of interest would otherwise paralyze the judicial
process when a "coequal branch of government maintains a substantial,
justiciable interest, 3 79 led him to depart from the statute's literal
meaning.
With these few exceptions, however, Justice Stevens' willingness to
pierce the linguistic veil usually implements substantive background tra-
ditions that preserve individual dignity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We can draw a number of conclusions from Justice Stevens'
Supreme Court opinions. First, what appears to be a complex combina-
tion of judicial restraint and creativity may not be so complex after all.
Justice Stevens is a maverick in the sense that he does not align himself
clearly with one group or another, but his judicial philosophy is still co-
herent. Sometimes he defers to other decisionmakers, such as states and
lower courts, to implement individual dignity values; at other times, he
abandons deference to serve those same values. This combination is rem-
iniscent of the traditional common law lawyer's attachment to both judi-
cial restraint and individual rights.
375. 485 U.S. 693, 708 (1988) (dissenting).
376. Id. at 1511 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93).
377. Id. at 1512 (emphasis added).
378. See supra notes 205-09, 217 and accompanying text.
379. Id.
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Second, there is continuity between his approach to constitutional
and statutory issues. Values that are entitled to constitutional protection
and involve individual dignity are relevant background conditions for in-
terpreting statutes. In the context of statutory interpretation, the protec-
tion of individual dignity values requires courts to pay close attention to
the facts of the particular case, a technique normally associated with ju-
dicial restraint. But a judge who applies a common law case-by-case ap-
proach to reconstructing legislative intent is less restrained than one who
defers to the plain meaning of statutory generalities.
Finally, Justice Stevens' rhetoric in his opinions comes very close to
describing accurately the reasons for his decisions. He tells us what
courts should and should not do, explicitly linking judicial restraint and
creativity to a theory of judging thatreveals its substantive bias. His
"choice for candor" 380 is an especially appropriate stance for a judge for
whom deliberative rationality is among the highest political values.
380. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR AN AGE OF STATUTES 179 (1982).
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